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Abstract
In everyday life, people frequently estimate their spending for projects and time periods. In the
present research, I extend previous work on self prediction into the realm of personal financial
behavior. Seven studies examine people's ability to predict their future personal spending and
processes underlying spending predictions. I found that people tended to underestimate their
future personal spending when predicting next week's spending (Studies 1-3), predicting that
they would spend substantially less money during an upcoming week than they actually did. On
average, participants underestimated their weekly expenditures by about 27%. However,
spending predictions for concrete events appeared to be exempt from the optimistic bias:
participants were remarkably accurate in predicting their spending across a wide variety of
concrete future purchases such as Birthday shopping and other self-nominated events (Studies 57). One source of bias in weekly spending predictions is people's savings goals - defined as the
general desire to save money or minimize future spending - at the time of prediction.
Participants who reported stronger savings goals (Studies 2, 3, 6, and 7) or were induced
experimentally to experience stronger savings goals (Study 4) predicted they would spend less
money in a future week. Because savings goals were not related significantly to participants'
actual spending they contributed to prediction bias. Somewhat ironically, then, the very
individuals who were more motivated to regulate their future personal spending were also most
inclined to generate unrealistic spending predictions. Notably, savings goals were not correlated
with predicted spending for a concrete future event. This disconnect between goals and
prediction might contribute to the accuracy of event spending predictions. The final study
revealed that weekly spending predictions could be de-biased by instructing forecasters to
consider the individual spending events associated with the future week prior to making a
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spending prediction. This cognitive strategy reduced reliance on savings goals during prediction
and eliminated the prediction bias for weekly spending predictions. In conclusion, the accuracy
of personal spending predictions depends on the prediction target and on existing goals
associated with the prediction.
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People's predictions about themselves guide many important decisions and behaviors.
Psychological researchers have explored the determinants of people's successes and failures in
predicting their future actions and experiences (for reviews see Dunning, 2007; Johnson &
Sherman, 1990; Ross & Buehler, 2001). In the present investigation, I extend the existing
research on the psychology of self prediction by studying people's forecasts of their own
behavior in the realm of personal finance. How and how well do people predict their future
personal spending? Surprisingly, despite their practical importance, these questions have not yet
been systematically addressed by psychological research. Although many determinants and
consequences of spending and money management behavior have been examined (Furnham,
1984, 1999; Faber & Vohs, 2004, Vohs & Faber, 2007; Kidwell, Brinberg, & Turrisi, 2003; Lee
& Ariely, 2006; Soman, 2001), little is known about people's ability to predict their own
personal spending (even though people spend lots of time doing so).
Examining personal spending predictions is important because these predictions might
have widespread practical and theoretical implications. Major life decisions (e.g., whether to
have a child, when to retire) as well as everyday choices (e.g., where to buy lunch, how to spend
the weekend) almost always involve a consideration of future expenses. In this domain
prediction errors can be costly, resulting in choices that are later regretted, or in unwise financial
decisions, and, ultimately, could contribute to increased stress and reduced well being. For
example, if people underestimate the amount they will spend in a future time period (e.g., next
week or next month) this could lead them to commit to events or purchases they will be unable to
afford, or to acquire excessive debt. In sum, the ability to estimate one's future expenses
accurately plays an important role in financial planning and adaptive decision making, and thus it
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is important to understand how and how well people predict future spending. Furthermore, from
a methodological standpoint, the domain of personal spending provides a rich context for
examining self-prediction processes. People have estimated future spending, implicitly or
explicitly, on countless occasions, and this accumulation of personal experience enables
researchers to search for recurrent patterns across time. Also, unlike many other self-relevant
prediction domains, the criteria for evaluating accuracy and bias are relatively clear and
unambiguous. Therefore, I believe there is practical and theoretical value in extending the study
of self-prediction into this particular domain.
There may be several sources of accuracy and bias in personal spending predictions. In
this examination I will focus primarily on motivational sources of bias: how much people wish to
spend might bias their forecast of how much they will realistically spend in the desired direction.
I will also examine different targets of prediction, in particular future spending during a time
period (e.g., a week, a day) and future spending during a concrete event (e.g., a birthday).
Bias in Predictions
Given the paucity of research on spending predictions, my hypotheses were guided by
research on prediction in other domains. The research indicates that self predictions are often
inaccurate and, in many cases, tend to be overly optimistic (for reviews see Armor & Taylor,
1998; Dunning, 2007; Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 2002). For example, students predict that they
will perform better in their course examinations than they actually do (Gilovich, Kerr, &
Medvec, 1993), and predict that they will receive more and better job offers after graduation than
they really do (Hoch, 1985). In general, people tend to view themselves as being more likely
than the next person to experience positive outcomes and less likely to experience negative
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outcomes (Weinstein, 1980) and think of their future selves in very positive terms (Markus &
Nurius, 1986).
Of particular relevance, researchers have documented a phenomenon known as the
"planning fallacy" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), wherein people underestimate the time they
will spend on a future task, even though they are fully aware that similar tasks have taken longer
in the past (for a review see Buehler, Griffin, & Peetz, 2010). For example, students, who
reported that they typically completed their writing assignments about a day before the due date,
predicted they would complete an upcoming essay a week before it was due; but they finished
the essay, as usual, about a day before the deadline. The tendency to underestimate completion
times has been observed for a wide range of personal, academic, and work-related tasks (e.g.,
Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; Buehler & Griffin, 2003; Byram, 1997; Kruger & Evans, 2004;
Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998). The planning fallacy is robust and persists even if the
planner is instructed to think pessimistically about a project (Buehler et al., 1994), and
generalizes across culture and personality traits (e.g., Buehler & Griffin, 2003; Pychyl, Morin, &
Salmon, 2000). I propose that a similar bias - a budget fallacy - may exist for personal spending
predictions. People may tend to predict that they will spend less money in the future than they
actually spend, or than they have spent in relevant previous circumstances.
Of course one cannot simply assume that people exhibit similar biases for predictions
concerning time and money; judgments sometimes diverge quite markedly across the two
domains (e.g., Hoorens, Remmers, & van de Riet, 1999; Soman, 2001; Zauberman & Lynch,
2005). Money has several characteristics that might make it easier to account for (e.g., it is a
stable unperishable resource, it can be accumulated and stored) and people may also be more
practiced in making judgments about money than time (Okada & Hoch, 2004; Soman, 2001).

4

There are also differences in the extent to which people expect to have spare time or spare
money in the future (Zauberman & Lynch, 2005). In particular, people believe that they will be
less busy and have more available spare time in the future than they have now, but do not
commit the same forecasting error for their expected spare money in the future compared to now.
This finding might suggest that forecasting spending is easier and less biased than forecasting
time, and that people might not exhibit a budget fallacy similar to the planning fallacy.
Nevertheless, intuition and indirect evidence lead me to believe that people tend to
underestimate future spending just like they underestimate completion times. For most
individuals, it seems to be a common experience to see their funds depleted sooner than
anticipated. Archival data suggests that families routinely overspend their earnings (e.g., nearly
50% of Canadian households spend more than their pre-tax income each year, Statcan, 2005).
Also, research on credit card adoption and use suggests that individuals' monthly expenses
typically exceed their expectations (Ausubel, 1991; Yang, Markoczy, & Qi, 2007). Yang et al.
found that consumers are insensitive to credit card interest fates because they intend to pay off
their outstanding balance each month, even though they carry such balances on a regular basis.
Although these studies did not assess spending predictions, they imply indirectly that people
routinely underestimate future expenses. The present series of studies explored spending
predictions directly and systematically.
Research on Spending
Although research involving money and finances is a rich field shared by psychologists,
economists and marketing researchers alike, research on personal spending predictions is
surprisingly sparse. For example, research examining general attitudes toward money and
spending includes mental accounting (Heath & Soil, 1996; Soman, 2001; Thaler, 1999),
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shopping goals (Lee & Ariely, 2006), materialism (Watson, 2003), and mutual fund investment
decisions (Moore, Kurtzberg, Fox, & Bazerman, 1999). This research is relevant to personal
spending predictions only in a very broad way, in that it examines how people think about
money. For example, people tend to think about their money within mental categories (e.g.,
money earmarked for entertainment, food, or clothing) and their spending decisions often do not
reference previous spending in other categories (Heath & Soil, 1996). This particular tendency
might make cross-category predictions, such as weekly or monthly spending predictions, quite
difficult.
Some research has directly examined spending behavior. This research is more relevant
to the study of personal spending predictions because past spending behavior may inform
predictions and spending behavior is the reality against which prediction accuracy is measured.
Spending behavior has been examined in research on impulse buying (Faber & Vohs, 2004,
Vohs & Faber, 2003), donation behavior (Desmet & Feinberg, 2003; Lee, Piliavin, & Call, 1999;
Sargeant, Ford, & West, 2006), and individual differences and contextual factors in spending
habits (Furnham, 1984, 1999; Kidwell et al., 2003). For example, depleted self-regulatory
resources led to higher incidence of impulse buying and also a greater willingness to pay
significantly more for an item (Vohs & Faber, 2003). One common thread in research on
spending behavior is that people's spending behavior is very resistant to change. Indeed,
theorists have characterized people's attempts to manage their actual spending behavior as a
particularly challenging problem of self-control (Faber & Vohs, 2004; Rabinovich & Webley,
2007).
More directly related to the idea of bias in spending predictions are existing accounts of
faulty budgets. For example, the Sydney Opera house was estimated to cost $7 million but a
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scaled down version opened at a total cost of $102 million (Hall, 1980). Forecasters of the '60s
and '70s routinely underestimated the cost of most inventions that came their way, ranging from
quatrosonic sound systems to space travel (Schnaars, 1989). The Canadian and the American
federal government are known to suffer vast forecasting errors in their annual budgets (Auld,
1984; Kwan & Cotsomitis, 2006; Penner, 2001). In a review of 258 public transportation projects
Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002) noted that 86% of these building projects ran over budget,
many of them by considerable amounts. It is important to note, though, that these anecdotes
primarily concern large project expenses.predicted by a team of specialists from and for large
organizations or governments. In such predictions, the predicting party might have different
interests than accuracy. Low expense estimations, rather than accuracy may be desirable when
preparing a pitch for a construction contract or when advocating a public program. Indeed,
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) suggest that building companies often deliberately underestimated costs
to secure building contracts.
Taken together, empirical and archival research has investigated how people spend their
money and how they think about their expenditures, and has even examined the budgeting of
large organizations, but the psychology of personal spending predictions is still little known. I
am aware of only one published study that examined personal spending predictions. Ulkiimen,
Thomas, and Morvitz (2008) examined the effect of ease of estimation and confidence on
people's monthly and yearly spending predictions. They found that participants in a high
confidence condition - who were told that people are generally accurate in their estimations - did
not adjust their initial estimate and thus made lower spending predictions. In contrast, low
confidence, plenty of cognitive resources, or the sense that the estimation was difficult was
associated with upward adjustment of the initial spending prediction. In only one of four studies
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Ulkumen et al. (2008) also assess actual spending to support their assumption that lower
spending predictions tend to be less accurate. However, they did not compare actual monthly
spending with the monthly prediction but instead tracked students' expenses for the duration of
one week and extrapolated actual monthly spending by multiplying this expense report by four.
Comparing different sums in this way is problematic. For example, there may be expenses that
only occur once a month (e.g., rent, major expenses) which could inflate (if they happen during
the tracked week) or suppress (if they don't happen during the tracked week) the extrapolated
monthly expense. When making a prediction about monthly spending, people presumably think
about their expenditures for an entire month, perhaps intending to spend early on and save their
money at the end of the month. The behavior in just one week can not reflect such longer term
plans. Despite this methodological problem, Ulkumen et al. (2008) report that people's monthly
predictions were significantly smaller than the extrapolated actual monthly spending, supporting
their initial assumption that low spending predictions tend to be less accurate. The present
investigation offers a more comprehensive and thorough examination of personal spending
predictions and their accuracy. It also examines in depth a motivational factor that may often
contribute to prediction bias.
The Role of Savings Goals
Research on the psychology of prediction has typically focused on cognitive processes
underlying prediction bias (Dunning, 2007; Griffin, Dunning, & Ross, 1990; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Ross & Buehler, 2001). However, in a recent review Dunning (2007) proposed
that variations in goals, although understudied in the literature to date, might be the key factor
that leads people to be overly optimistic or pessimistic in their self predictions. Goals and
predictions are of course distinct constructs: Whereas goals represent desired future states,
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predictions represent beliefs about what will actually transpire (Austin & Vancouver, 1996;
Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Karniol & Ross, 1996). However, people's goals could often be an
important determinant of their predictions. Consistent with this proposal, I chose to explore the
role of people's goals as they generate spending predictions. In the realm of personal finance
there is one overarching goal that I believe is so pervasive that it warrants research attention.
Arguably, most people prefer to minimize their expenses, save money, and keep their
expenditures under control. I refer to this seemingly ubiquitous goal as a "savings goal" and
suggest that it may fuel people's tendency to generate unrealistic predictions. In essence, then, I
am proposing that people tend to underestimate how much they will spend because their
preference or desire is to keep their future spending in check.
The idea that people's predictions may be biased by preferences and desires is grounded
in theory. Variants of this idea have appeared in the literature on motivated reasoning (for review
see Kunda, 1990) and, more recently, the desirability bias hypothesis (for review see Krizan &
Windschitl, 2007). According to the motivated reasoning framework, many kinds of judgments
are guided not only by accuracy goals (the desire to reach a correct conclusion) but also by
directional goals (the desire to reach a particular conclusion). This is not to say that people
simply choose to believe whatever they wish; their judgments are subject to reality constraints
and so they will only draw a desired conclusion if it seems reasonable based on the available
evidence. However, a salient directional goal often prompts individuals to process the relevant
evidence selectively, in a manner that makes the desired conclusion seem reasonable. The
desirability bias, wherein people generate predictions corresponding with their preferences, is a
specific case of motivated reasoning and thought to operate similarly, though it refers more
specifically to people's predictions about future outcomes (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007).
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Consistent with this previous theorizing, then, I propose that a strong directional goal (i.e.,
savings goals) will result in biased predictions corresponding to that goal.
Such a finding would complement existing theory, and address a number of limitations in
the empirical evidence that have been identified by Krizan and Windschitl (2007). First, although
the idea of a desirability bias has been prevalent, very few studies have varied people's
preferences experimentally in order to demonstrate a causal impact on prediction. Second,
although motivated reasoning has been documented for many kinds of judgments (e.g., ratings of
one's traits and abilities, Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989; the persuasiveness of arguments, Kunda,
1987) the findings may not be applicable to predictions concerning specific behaviors. As Krizan
and Windschitl (pp. 96) noted, predictions are likely to elicit a higher level of accuracy
motivation than other kinds of judgments that have been shown to be susceptible to motivated
reasoning, because the predictor often knows that the accuracy of the prediction can soon be
evaluated. Accuracy motivation tends to constrain judgmental bias (for reviews see Kunda, 1990;
Pittman, 1998). Thus the present research will help determine whether motivated biases in
judgment extend to self-predictions in particular. Third, the desirability bias in prediction has
typically been studied for outcomes that are not under the predictor's control (e.g., sporting
events, elections, and games of chance) and thus it is important to test whether the bias will
generalize to more controllable, personal outcomes.
An important feature of controllable outcomes is that people's goals can influence their
actual attainments, both directly through an increased commitment to undertake the necessary
actions (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Locke & Latham, 2002), and indirectly through the process
of generating corresponding plans (Armor & Taylor, 2003; Gollwitzer, 1999; Taylor et al.,
1998). Thus, unlike uncontrollable outcomes (where there is a clear normative dictate that
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preferences should not influence expectations) it could be perfectly reasonable to generate
predictions corresponding to one's goals. Whether the goals create a bias in prediction will
depend upon their relative impact on prediction versus behavior. To the extent that a goal has a
differential impact on predicted than actual outcomes, it will produce biased predictions.
I expect that savings goals are likely to have a substantially greater impact on predicted
than on actual spending. It is relatively easy and straightforward to generate a prediction that
corresponds with one's current savings goal - the prediction may be seen as a natural extension
of one's goal - but it will often be much more difficult to translate the goal into behavior. Recall
that theorists have characterized people's attempts to manage their personal spending as a
particularly challenging problem of self control (Faber & Vohs, 2004; Rabinovich & Webley,
2007). Individuals in western societies encounter a steady barrage of temptations and pressures
to spend that are often difficult to resist. Also, because people have multiple goals at any point in
time, the goals salient at prediction (e.g., to reduce spending) may later collide with other goals
that demand increased spending (e.g., to take a vacation, to provide opportunities for one's
children, to support a worthy cause). In light of the myriad challenges involved in controlling
expenditures, it seems plausible that savings goals would tend to exert a greater impact on
predicted than on actual spending.
A few previous studies buttress this theorizing by showing that people's motives and
intentions can bias their predictions by exerting a stronger impact on predicted than on actual
behavior (Buehler, Griffin, & MacDonald, 1997; Byram, 1997; Koehler & Poon, 2006). For
example, Koehler and Poon demonstrated that strong intentions to perform desirable behaviors
(e.g., donating blood, volunteering for research) can lead people to overestimate the likelihood
that they will perform these acts. Participants tended to overweight the strength of their current
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intentions, and underweight other situational or contextual factors that determined whether they
would actually act on their intentions. It seems plausible that a similar pattern could emerge in
the realm of personal spending, wherein people's savings goals exert a greater impact on
predicted than on actual spending behavior. If this were the case, then savings goals could hurt
spending prediction accuracy and lead to optimistic bias.
Different Forms of Bias in Predictions
There are several different ways to measure prediction accuracy, such as absolute error,
systematic bias, and discrimination or correlational accuracy (Buehler et al., 1994; Epley &
Dunning, 2006). Absolute error is characterized as both over- and underestimation of the actual
value and can be measured by the absolute difference between predicted and actual spending.
Bias is present when predictions tend to err in the same direction, and can be assessed by the
signed difference score between predicted and actual values. Discrimination or correlational
accuracy is indicated by the correlation between predicted and actual behavior. Correlational
accuracy and systematic bias can be quite discrepant within any particular set of predictions
(Buehler et al., 1994; Savitsky, Epley, & Gilovich, 2001;Gagne & Lydon, 2004) and are
statistically independent. For example, a participant might predict spending little money
compared with others in the sample and actually spend more than predicted (systematic bias)
while still spending less than the rest of the sample (correlational accuracy).
The present studies focused primarily on the degree of systematic bias in prediction, as
this outcome is arguably most critical for real world spending predictions. Even if people are
good at predicting how much they spend in relation to other people (i.e., correlational accuracy)
a tendency to underestimate actual expenses (i.e., systematic bias) could have serious practical
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consequences. Thus, although I examine both forms of accuracy, the main thrust of the present
research is to document and understand the hypothesized underestimation bias.
Spending Prediction Targets
In everyday life, people make a multitude of spending predictions about many different
targets. For example, people might make personal spending predictions when withdrawing
money from an ATM, when exchanging currency for a trip, or when deciding whether they can
afford a tempting purchase or commit to an interesting event. Some of these predictions might be
more accurate than others. In this examination I distinguish between spending predictions about
concrete events (such as an upcoming birthday party or a planned shopping trip) and spending
predictions about entire time periods (such as next week, next month or the upcoming vacation).
In the present research I examine both types of spending predictions. In the first four studies I
investigate weekly spending predictions, while the last three studies examine both event and
weekly spending predictions concurrently.
Time prediction research has primarily examined completion predictions for events (see
Buehler et al., 2010 for a review), such as the completion of tax returns, anagram tasks, and
school assignments. Thus, the direct parallel to completion time forecasts would be spending
forecasts for concrete events. A commonly used procedure in time prediction research is to
assign participants an experimental task and ask them to generate predictions about it, in order to
keep the task characteristics constant for all participants. I could not adopt this procedure
because ethical concerns and financial resources did not allow me to assign participants a
common spending task. Instead I asked participants to self-nominate a future event they expect
to spend money on (a procedure adopted in Study 6 and 7) - however, these nominated spending
events are potentially very different across participants. For these reasons, I chose time periods
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as starting point for an investigation of spending predictions and examine concrete spending
events and weeks concurrently in the latter part of this project. Time periods (such as weeks) are
a convenient spending prediction target because they are similar in scope and temporal distance
across all participants. In addition, spontaneous personal spending predictions might often target
time periods, rather than events, because salaries, rent and other external markers of financial
planning usually occur within the time period units.
I suggest that spending predictions will be generated differently depending on the target
of the prediction, and that consequently, predictions might be more or less accurate. As will be
discussed in the introduction to Study 5, events and time periods differ in several relevant aspects
that might affect spending prediction accuracy.
Overview: The Present Research
A series of seven studies systematically investigated people's ability to predict their
future personal spending. I examined spending predictions both for a future time period (the next
week; Studies 1-4) and for concrete spending events (Studies 5-7). The degree of accuracy
versus bias in prediction was assessed by comparing predicted spending with subsequent reports
of actual spending.
I also assessed participants' recollections of previous spending in Studies 1 - 3 . These
measures not only provide an additional reference point for interpreting predictions, they also
allowed me to test a memory bias account that has been proposed for biased predictions of task
duration (Roy, Christenfeld, & McKenzie, 2005) and might be applicable to biased predictions of
spending. According to a memory bias account, people generate biased predictions because they
base the predictions on biased memories of past experience. This account implies that predicted
spending should be very similar to memories of previous spending. In contrast, the present
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theoretical account implies that savings goals will motivate people to believe they can reduce
their expenditures, and thus they will predict spending less than they remember spending
previously.
Study 1 tested whether participants underestimate future weekly spending. The next three
studies explored the hypothesized role of savings goals. The studies introduced measures
(Studies 2 and 3) and manipulations (Study 4) of people's savings goals and examined their
relation to predicted and actual spending. There were two main hypotheses: First, people tend to
underestimate the amount of money they will spend in a future time period. Second, this
prediction bias is produced, in part, by people's savings goals at the time of prediction.
Specifically, savings goals have a greater impact on predicted than on actual spending behavior,
and thus contribute to biased spending predictions.
In Studies 5, 6, and 7,1 examined spending for concrete events and weeks concurrently,
either for self nominated spending events in the near future or for a specified spending event (a
birthday). There are a number of reasons to expect that predictions might be generated
differently for specific events spending than for time periods, and the introduction to Study 5
reviews potential differences in how people think about event and time period spending. Finally,
Study 7 examines how considering individual spending events prior to prediction (event-type
thinking) affects both weekly and event spending predictions.
In sum, the present investigation tests three main hypotheses: First, people tend to
underestimate the amount of money they will spend in a future time period. Second, this
prediction bias is produced, at least in part, by people's motivation to save money. Third,
people's event predictions might differ in meaningful ways from their weekly time period
predictions.
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Study 1
This study provided an initial test of the hypothesis that people tend to underestimate,
systematically and repeatedly, the amount of money they will spend in a future time period.
Participants predicted the amount they would spend in the coming week and subsequently
reported their actual spending.
Method
Participants. Participants were 31 students (24 female and 7 male) aged 18 to 24 (M =
21.22, SD = 1.48) recruited from undergraduate classes by means of e-mail announcements and
offered $8 to complete two online questionnaires.1
Procedure. In the initial questionnaire, participants were first asked to predict their
spending for the target week: "How much money do you think you will spend next week (i.e.,
the next seven days; all expenses included except things that occur only once a month such as
rent)?" Then they were asked to recall their spending in the past week: "How much money did
you spend last week (i.e., the past seven days; all expenses included except things that occur only
once a month such as rent)?" See Appendix A and B for a summary of prediction instructions
across all studies. In the second questionnaire, one week later, participants were asked to report
how much money they actually spent during the target week, and then to predict how much
money they would spend in the upcoming week, using the same questions as in the initial
session.
Results and Discussion
Participants predicted they would spend less money during the target week (M= 94.33,
SD = 77.27) than they subsequently reported spending during that week (M= 121.67, SD =
195.11), /(30) = 2.29,p < .05, d= .84, or than they recalled spending during the previous week
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(M= 126.03, SD = 117.70), f(30) = 2.14,/? < .05,rf= .78 (Table 1). Reports of actual spending
did not differ significantly across the two weeks, /(30) = .62, ns, d = .23. Thus participants
underestimated their actual spending by about 23%; and also predicted to spend 25% less than
they had previously. At the end of the second session, participants again predicted they would
spend less money in the upcoming week (M= 85.17, SD = 75.77) than they reported spending
during either the target week, r(30) = 2.59,p< .05, d = .95, or the week before that, /(30) = 2.24,
p < .05, d = .82, suggesting that they failed to learn from their experience in the study.
Despite the prediction bias observed at the mean level, participants' predicted spending
for the target week was strongly correlated with the amount they reported spending that week,
r(29) = .61,/? < .001, and the amount they recalled spending the previous week, r(29) = .75,/? <
.001. Thus participants who predicted spending more money, relative to other participants, also
reported spending relatively large amounts of money. This pattern is consistent with previous
evidence that there can be strong correlations between predicted and actual behavior (i.e.,
correlational accuracy) even when predictions are systematically biased (e.g., Buehler et al.,
1994; Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000).
The findings support the hypothesis that people are inclined to underestimate their future
personal spending. Also, in contrast to a memory bias account, the bias in prediction did not
appear to result from participants basing their predictions on biased recollections of previous
spending. Participants' actual spending during the target week was, on average, nearly identical
to the amount they recalled spending in a previous week. However, predicted spending was
substantially lower than recalled spending, suggesting that participants were not inclined to base
their predictions on memories of past experience. My interpretation is that many participants
hoped to reduce spending, and thus generated predictions corresponding with their goals for the
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future rather than their previous experience. The next study examined the role of goals in
spending predictions.
Study 2
Study 1 relied on retrospective reports of spending during the target week, which could
have been prone to errors and bias in memory. Thus one purpose of the next study was to
replicate the evidence of a prediction bias using diary measures of actual spending that should be
less susceptible to memory bias. The second purpose was to explore the relation between
people's goals to reduce future spending (i.e., savings goals) and their tendency to underestimate
future spending. Thus I assessed participants' savings goals, asked them to predict their spending
for the upcoming week, and then tracked their actual spending with daily diary measures.
Method
Participants. The participants were 36 university students recruited for a study that
examined people's attitudes and beliefs about money. Participants were compensated with
course credit and a chance to win a $50 gift card.
Procedure. Participants first completed a questionnaire concerning their general attitudes
and beliefs toward spending and saving money. One item embedded in this questionnaire
assessed savings goals: Participants rated their agreement with the statement that, in general,
saving money is very important for them (1 = Disagree Entirely, 10 = Agree Entirely).
Participants also rated the extent to which they agreed that: in general money is important, they
save a big percentage of their available money, and they know exactly what they spend their
money on (1 = Disagree Entirely, 10 = Agree Entirely). See Appendix C for a copy of the money
attitudes survey. These supplementary items were included primarily to reduce the salience of
the savings goal item. Following these ratings, participants were asked, as in Study 1, to predict
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how much money they would spend in the coming week. This overall prediction was used as a
primary measure of predicted spending.
Participants were then asked to complete a daily diary procedure beginning the day after
the questionnaire session. They were given a package containing fourteen daily recording sheets:
seven morning questionnaires that asked participants to predict as early in the day as possible
how much they would spend that day (i.e., predicted daily spending), and seven evening
questionnaires that asked participants to report as late in the day as possible how much money
they had actually spent that day (i.e., reported daily spending). In addition, a final questionnaire
asked participants to recall how much they had spent over the entire week (i.e., reported weekly
spending). Participants were instructed to complete each sheet and record the date and time it
was completed, to place it in the envelope provided, and to avoid consulting or revising sheets
they had already completed. (See Appendix D for a copy of the diary surveys.) After the target
week, participants returned the envelope to a central location on campus and received their
compensation.
Results and Discussion
Predicted and actual weekly spending. Participants reported on average that they
completed the morning questionnaires at 9:30 a.m. and the evening questionnaires at 11:30 p.m.
Actual spending for the target week was assessed in two ways: by summing the reports of daily
spending (M= 150.75, SD = 78.54) and by the report of overall spending at the end of the week
(M= 166.21, SD =97.31) (Table 2). These two measures were highly correlated, r(32) = .79,p <
.001, did not differ significantly, r(33) = .55,p = .29, d= .19, and yielded an identical pattern of
results. For brevity I report only the analyses using the summed daily reports of actual spending
(See Table 2 and 4 for additional analyses using the follow up reports). I then compared
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participants' overall prediction of their weekly spending with the summed daily report of actual
spending. Consistent with the primary hypothesis, participants predicted they would spend less
money in the coming week (M =95.00, SD = 67.31) than they actually spent {M- 150.75, SD =
78.54), ^(34) = 3.18,p < .01, d = 1.09. Thus they underestimated their weekly spending by about
37%. Interestingly, unlike Study 1, predicted spending was not correlated significantly with
actual spending, r(33) = -.0l,p = .48, d= -.003.
Predicted and actual daily spending. To compare predicted and actual daily spending, I
first created an index of each participant's predicted and actual daily spending by averaging
across daily reports. I then compared participants' summed daily prediction with the summed
daily report of actual spending. A paired t-test indicated that predicted daily spending (M =
168.56, SD = 79.17) did not differ significantly from actual daily spending (M = 150.75, SD =
78.54), /(33) = -.70, p = .24, d= -.24. It is notable that the overall spending prediction for the
week that was generated at the beginning of the week was biased, but the sum of the daily
predicted spending was accurate, compared to actual spending for the week. Further analyses
that distinguished between weekends (i.e., Friday through Sunday) and weekdays (i.e., Monday
through Thursday) indicated that participants did not underestimate their daily spending
significantly either on weekends, t(3l) = 1.30,/? = .10, d= .47, or on weekdays, t(3l) = .53,p =
.30, d=.\8 (Table 3).
The role of savings goals. A preliminary examination of the savings goal item indicated
that, in general, participants thought it was important to be saving money (M= 7.19, SD = 2.04,
on a 10-point scale). Given that participants tended to underestimate their weekly spending, I
performed a series of regression analyses to test our hypothesis that the magnitude of the
prediction bias would be related to savings goals. I first regressed participants' predicted and
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actual weekly spending (in separate analyses) on their savings goals. Consistent with the
hypotheses, participants' saving goals were a significant predictor of their predicted spending,/3
= -.37, r(33) = -2.30,/? < .05, d= .80, but not of their actual spending,^ = -.15, r(34) = -.87,/? =
.20, d = .30. That is, participants who endorsed a savings goal more strongly predicted that they
would spend less money in the coming week, but did not actually spend less money.3
Consequently, participants with a stronger savings goal tended to underestimate their future
spending to a greater degree.4 This relation is depicted in Figure 1.
I next performed a multiple regression analysis wherein predicted weekly spending was
regressed first on actual spending (step 1) and then also on savings goals (step 2). Essentially,
this is a multiple regression test of prediction bias, in which bias is defined as that part of the
variance in spending predictions that is not related to actual spending. Thus the analysis provides
a sensitive test of the hypothesis that savings goals are a significant determinant of prediction
bias. Consistent with this hypothesis, after controlling for actual spending, participants' saving
goals were still significantly related to their predictions,^ = -.38, t(32) - -2.31,p < .05, d = .80.
In sum, the results for weekly spending offer further support for the primary hypothesis
that people tend to underestimate future personal spending. Participants predicted they would
spend significantly less in the coming week than they subsequently reported spending. This
finding replicates the prediction bias observed in Study 1 using a daily diary methodology that
should be less susceptible to memory bias than previous measures. Notably, daily spending
predictions did not exhibit the same bias found for weekly predictions (and were not correlated
significantly with saving goals, r(32) = -.08,/? = .33). Although speculative, this finding may be
interpreted as an instance of people's tendency to generate less optimistic predictions for
outcomes as they become closer in time (e.g., Gilovich et al., 1993; Shepperd, Ouellette, &
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Fernandez, 1996). People may shift from optimism as events draw near because they are
responding to new information that becomes available or to brace themselves for the possibility
of an undesired outcome (for a review of possible mechanisms see Carroll, Sweeny, & Shepperd,
2006). Alternatively, the absence of bias may be attributable to the recurrence of prediction and
outcome feedback for the daily predictions. I offer these interpretations cautiously, however, as
this was the only study that assessed the accuracy of daily spending predictions. It might even be
that brief time periods are more concrete and more similar to spending events. This analysis
might therefore foreshadow differences for concrete event spending predictions compared with
weekly spending predictions.
The study also provided evidence for the hypothesized role of savings goals. Individuals
who reported a stronger desire to save money were more inclined to underestimate their weekly
spending, because savings goals were a stronger determinant of predicted than actual spending.
Although the findings are correlational, they are consistent with the idea that savings goals exert
a stronger impact on predicted than actual spending and thus contribute to prediction bias.
However, a potential alternative explanation is that the results reflect experimental demands for
consistent responding. I attempted to minimize experimental demand by embedding the measure
of savings goals in a series of other measures and by assessing the goals at a very global level,
without reference to the target time period. Nevertheless, participants who had just endorsed a
goal to save money may have felt pressure, for the sake of consistency, to also predict they
would actually spend less in the future. This consistency account also provides another
explanation for why the daily spending predictions - which did not follow immediately after the
measure of savings goals - were neither biased nor related to savings goals. Thus the next study
was designed to test the viability of this alternative account.
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Study 3
To test the consistency account, I experimentally varied whether participants' spending
predictions were separated in time from their endorsement of savings goals, and examined the
relation between goals and predictions. In an initial questionnaire, all participants rated their
savings goals. In a second questionnaire, some participants rated their savings goals again and
then predicted their spending for the upcoming week (immediate prediction condition) whereas
others only predicted their spending (delayed prediction condition). Although I did not track
participants' actual spending (because I was concerned primarily with the relation between goals
and prediction) all participants did report their previous week's spending. According to the
consistency account, the relation between savings goals and spending predictions should
disappear, or be attenuated, for goals assessed separately from predictions.
Method
Participants. Participants were 88 psychology students (71 female, 17 male) ranging in
age from 17 to 33 years {M— 18.70, SD = 1.74) who were compensated with course credit.
Procedure. In an online pre-test questionnaire at the start of term, participants rated their
savings goals as in Study 2, by indicating their agreement with the statement that, in general,
saving money is very important to them (1 = Completely Disagree, 7 = Completely Agree). The
measure was again embedded in a series of supplementary items concerning their general beliefs
about money. After an interval of several days or weeks (M= 48.1 days, SD = 61.3) participants
completed a second online questionnaire, and were randomly assigned to one of two versions. In
the immediate prediction condition, participants rated their savings goals again, predicted their
spending for the upcoming week, and indicated how much they had spent in the past week; thus
they made spending predictions immediately after endorsing their savings goals. In the delayed
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prediction condition, participants predicted their spending for the upcoming week and indicated
how much they spent in the past week; thus their spending predictions were temporally removed
from their endorsement of savings goals.
Results and Discussion
Predicted and past spending. Participants predicted to spend less money during the
upcoming week ( M = 100.55, SD = 61.24) than they spent the past week (M = l 15.67, SD =
71.49), r(87) = 2.11,/? = .04, d = .45 (Table 5). Thus, there was again no evidence that
participants' predictions were directly aligned with their memories of previous spending (cf. Roy
et al., 2005) - they expected to reduce their spending on average by 13%. There were no
significant differences across conditions in predicted spending, F ( l , 86) = .87, p = .35, or past
spending, F{\, 86) = 1.59,/? = .21, suggesting that measuring goals immediately before spending
predictions did not affect the predictions.
The role of savings goals. According to the consistency account, the relation between
savings goals and spending predictions should disappear or be attenuated when the goals are
assessed separately from the predictions. Using the entire sample, I found that savings goals
reported in the initial session were significantly correlated with spending predictions generated
much later, r(86) = -.38, p < .001. This link was equally strong in both conditions, z = .42,/? =
67. Similarly, an analysis that regressed predicted spending on both past spending and savings
goals reported at the initial session, revealed that the savings goals explained variance in
predicted spending, fi = -.28, ?(86) = -3.06,p < .01, d = .66, over and above that explained by
past spending,fi = .43, ^(86) = 4.72,/? < .001, d = 1.01. Savings goals did not significantly
predict the size of participants' past week's spending in the immediate condition, r(42) = -.20, p
= .20, or in the delayed condition, r(42) = -.15,p = .33.
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Then, I examined the strength of the correlation between goals and predictions by
condition, finding that this link did not depend on the timing of predictions. First, within the
immediate prediction condition, the goal-prediction correlation was as strong for goals reported
at the initial session, r(42) = -.32, p < .05, as for goals reported immediately prior to prediction,
r(42) = -.37, p < .05, z = .26, p = .37 (Table 6). Second, between-subject comparisons also
revealed that the goal-prediction correlation was as strong for goals reported at the initial session
(delayed prediction condition, r(42) = -.40,/? < .01) and goals reported right before prediction
(immediate prediction condition, r(42) = -.37,p < .05), z = .16,p = .87. Third, when spending
predictions were regressed on the most recent rating of savings goals (Tl goals in the delayed
prediction condition and T2 goals in the immediate prediction condition), the prediction
condition (0 = delayed, 1 = immediate), and the goals by condition interaction term, there was a
significant effect of savings goals (fi = -.43, /(85) = -2.59, p < .05, d= .56) and no interaction
effect (/? = .11, t(85) = .28,p = .39, d= .06). These results indicate that the relation between
savings goals and predictions did not depend on predictions being measured immediately after
the endorsement of goals.
The findings provide further evidence for the relation between people's savings goals and
their optimistic spending predictions and, importantly, address the possible role of experimental
demands for consistency. Contrary to a consistency account, participants' predictions did not
differ whether their savings goals were assessed immediately before prediction or well in
advance. Also, goals assessed well in advance of spending predictions were as strongly related to
predictions as were goals assessed immediately before the predictions. Thus it does not appear
that either the prediction bias itself, or the role of savings goals in this bias, is simply an artifact
of asking participants to make predictions shortly after stating their savings goals.
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Study 4
The results so far are correlational and thus, although consistent with the hypotheses, do
not establish a casual impact of goals on prediction. In the next study I attempted to establish a
more direct causal link between participants' goals at the time of prediction and the bias in their
predictions. The procedure was similar to that of Study 2 with the exception that I manipulated,
rather than simply measured, the strength of participants' desire to save money, and then
examined the impact of this manipulation on both predicted and actual spending. Again I
expected that participants with a stronger savings goal would be more inclined to underestimate
their future spending, because this goal would exert a stronger impact on predicted than on actual
spending.
Method
Participants. Participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology classes for a
study that included an initial questionnaire at the lab followed by a series of online
questionnaires during the next week. A total of 43 undergraduate students completed the initial
questionnaire, and 31 of these participants also completed follow-up questionnaires. This
attrition did not differ by condition, x'idf^ 1, N = 43) = .12, jc = .73. The sample for all analyses
consisted of the 31 participants (13 male and 18 female) who completed both the initial
questionnaire and the final online questionnaire.
Procedure. In the initial questionnaire, participants first completed an exercise designed
to vary the strength of their desire to save money. They were told that research indicates people
are more successful in life if they either save money (strong savings goal condition) or spend
without restraint (weak savings goal condition) and were presented with several reasons for this
finding (see Appendix E for a copy of the manipulation). As a manipulation check, participants
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then completed four items assessing their current endorsement of savings goals. They rated the
extent to which they agreed that people who save money are more successful in life, that it is
important to think twice before spending money, that they will try to save at least some money in
the future, and that they will try hard not to waste money in the future (1 = Disagree

Completely,

10 = Agree Completely). Following the manipulation check, participants predicted their spending
for the upcoming week.
The follow-up measures were similar to those in Study 2 but presented in an online
format. Following the initial questionnaire session, participants received an e-mail message
containing a link to the online daily diary. They were instructed to sign on to a computer each
morning to predict their daily spending, and each evening to report their actual daily spending.
At the end of the week, participants completed a final online questionnaire in which they
reported how much they had spent during the target week. Finally, they predicted how much they
would spend during the upcoming week (i.e., the seven days after the final questionnaire).
Results and Discussion
Predicted and actual spending. Unlike Study 2, where each participant provided a
complete diary, fully 12 participants failed to complete at least one daily report and several
participants missed multiple entries (the mean number of entries was 9.3 out of 14). The increase
in missing entries may reflect the switch to an online format wherein participants needed to
access a computer to complete the measures. In any case, due to the incompleteness of the
diaries, I did not analyze daily spending in this study, and I used the report of overall spending
on the final questionnaire as the measure of actual spending for the target week. A preliminary
comparison of predicted and actual spending for the target week revealed once again that
participants predicted to spend less (M= 104.19, SD = 54.65) than they reported actually

27

spending (M= 166.81, SD = 117.20), f(30) = 3.36,/? < .001, d= 1.22 (Table 7). Predicted and
actual spending were, however, significantly correlated, r(29) = .59,p < .001.
The role of savings goals. I averaged across the four manipulation check items to create
an index of participants' current savings goals (a = .63). Participants reported a stronger
endorsement of saving goals in the strong (M= 8.11, SD - 1.20) than in the weak savings goal
condition (M= 7.33, SD = .76), t(29) = 2.14,;? < .05, d= .78, suggesting that the manipulation
was successful in varying the strength of participants' current savings goals.
To test our hypotheses concerning the role of savings goals in prediction bias, the
measures of predicted and actual spending were submitted to a 2 (spending measure: predicted
vs. actual) by 2 (savings goal condition: strong vs. weak) ANOVA. A main effect of measure
confirmed again that predicted spending was significantly lower than actual spending, F(l, 29) =
14.13,/? < .001. More importantly, there was a significant interaction effect, F(\, 29) = 4.20,/? <
.05, and an examination of the relevant means and contrasts supported our hypothesis (Figure 2).
Participants predicted to spend less money in the strong (M= 83.13, SD = 51.28) than in the
weak savings goal condition (M= 126.67, SD = 50.34), t(29) = 2.38,/? < .05, d= .87. However,
actual spending did not differ significantly across the strong (M= 178.19, SD = 138.98) and
weak savings goal conditions (M= 154.67, SD = 91.84), t(29) = .55,/? = .29, d=.20. Thus, as
anticipated, savings goals had a greater impact on predicted than on actual spending.
Participants' tendency to underestimate their future spending was significant in the strong
savings goal condition, ^(15) = 3.91,/? < .001, d- 2.02, but not in the weak savings goal
condition, ^(14)= 1.29,/? = .11, d= .69.
To further examine the role of savings goals in prediction bias, I performed a multiple
regression analysis as in Study 2, wherein predicted weekly spending was regressed first on
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actual spending (step 1) and then also on the dummy coded (0 = Weak, 1 = Strong) savings goal
condition (step 2). Participants' spending predictions were determined partially by actual
spending,./? = .59, t(29) = 3.92,p < .001, d= 1.46; however, after controlling for actual spending
the savings goals still significantly influenced predicted spending,^ = -.47, /(28) = 3.15,p. <
.001, d = 1.39. This result provides further evidence that savings goals contributed to prediction
bias.
I also examined spending predictions for the week following the study. Predicted
spending for the future week did not differ significantly across the strong ( M - 112.81, SD =
103.92) and weak savings goal conditions ( M = 125.20, SD = 83.14), t(29) = 37,p = .36, d =
.13, suggesting that the impact of the savings goal manipulation had diminished over the week of
the study. Interestingly, participants predicted they would spend less money in the future week
than they reported spending during the target week in both the strong, t(\5) = 2.5%,p = .02, d =
1.33, and the weak savings goal condition, ?(14) = 2.46,p = .03, d= 1.31.
In sum, the study again demonstrated people's tendency to underestimate their future
spending, and provided experimental evidence that a goal to save money, rather than spend
without restraint, is linked causally to the prediction bias. Participants predicted they would
spend less money in the coming week when they were induced to experience stronger savings
goals. Because savings goals did not affect actual spending behavior, they produced a bias in
prediction.
It is worth considering, once again, the possible role of demand characteristics. Given
that the manipulation of savings goals occurred immediately prior to the manipulation checks
and prediction measures, it is conceivable that the results reflected experimental demand.
However, I was struck by the convergence of results across several studies including, notably,
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one which separated the measurement of goals and predictions. This convergence of findings
helps to allay potential concerns about experimental demand in a particular study, and increases
confidence in the interpretation of the series of studies as a whole.
One important limitation of all the previous studies is that they examined spending
predictions for time periods rather than specific events. I now turned to examine whether the bias
observed in the first four studies would generalize to predictions about specific events.
Study 5
In everyday life, spending predictions may be made about time periods (when we
estimate how much money we'll need in the next week) or about concrete purchases (when we
estimate spending for one specific event, such as a birthday celebration or a shopping trip). The
type of target might influence how spending predictions are generated and how accurate they are.
Indeed, predictions for concrete events might be a naturalistic example of a situation in which
spending predictions are relatively unbiased. The next three studies extend the investigation of
spending predictions to concrete spending events, while comparing them to spending predictions
for weekly time periods.
Thoughts about time periods and concrete events might differ on a number of relevant
dimensions including the level construal (Liberman & Trope, 1998), and the level of complexity
of the prediction task (Wood, Mento, & Locke, 1987). According to temporal construal theory
(TCT; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003), thoughts about the future can be
construed at different levels of abstraction. High-level construals contain abstract features like
the desirability of a future action whereas low-level or concrete construals contain more
concrete, contextualized representations of the specific case at hand, like the feasibility of
performing an action (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Arguably, people will adopt a relatively high-
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level, abstract construal for weekly prediction targets, because a mental representation as general
and abstract as an entire week is necessarily impoverished in details and can be thought of only
abstractly. In contrast, people might be more likely to adopt a low-level, concrete construal for
individual spending events because incidental, specific features of this event (e.g., how to get to
the event, what the weather will be like) come to mind easily. Mental representations of entire
weeks and individual events might also differ in complexity or the number of subcomponents
that come to mind. Complex tasks involve more distinct acts, informational cues, and coordination across time than simple tasks (Wood, Mento, & Locke, 1987). An entire week is
necessarily more complex than any given event during the week, because it includes several
spending events. Thus, weekly spending predictions include more subcomponents than event
spending predictions.
The different features of time periods and events might affect spending predictions in a
number of ways. First, because it is cognitively easier to assess prediction targets with fewer
subcomponents than complex targets (Kruger & Evans, 2004), spending predictions for
individual events may be easier to generate than weekly spending predictions. This reasoning
suggests that event spending predictions will be more accurate than weekly spending predictions,
simply due to ease of processing. My findings in Study 2 might indirectly support this argument,
because daily predictions - which should be simpler and contain fewer subcomponents - were
more accurate than weekly predictions. Second, when considering concrete events, people's
representations of these events might contain specific and peripheral information which remind
participants of other goals that would require considerable spending in addition to, or in place of,
their general goal to control their spending. For example, when predicting how much one will
spend on gifts for a loved one, one might focus not only on one's general goal of saving money
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but also on how to make the recipient of the gift happy. Being aware of goals that require
spending money might increase prediction accuracy because it reduces the tendency to focus on
a single, biasing goal (for similar processes see Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002; for a
review see Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). Third, the influence of savings goals might be reduced
when predicting concrete events rather than abstract time periods because feasibility concerns
might be more on people's minds than desirability concerns (Liberman & Trope, 1998).
Concrete low-construal events might elicit a focus on a variety of feasibility concerns, such as
the need to spend money on groceries, or to take the bus to the mall because it is too cold to
walk. In contrast, because time periods are relatively abstract, they might elicit a higher level
construal that is focused on the desirability of controlling spending and saving money.
In sum, there is reason to expect that the cognitions underlying predictions about events
and time periods should differ meaningfully. Concrete events might be more accurately
forecasted than abstract and complex weekly spending. Additionally, the goal to minimize
spending and save money might be more influential when people predict abstract spending
targets rather than concrete, low level spending targets. Because savings goals have been shown
to bias spending predictions (Studies 2-4), a reduction in this biasing influence should lead to
greater prediction accuracy for concrete events than for time periods.
The next study provided an initial test of the hypothesis that people make relatively
unbiased estimates of the amount of money they will spend for a future event. Participants
predicted the amount they would spend for a specific upcoming event (a birthday celebration) or
an upcoming week and subsequently reported their actual spending. Participants also reported
how much they focused on financial goals when generating their prediction. I have proposed that
people are more inclined to use financial goals as a basis for predicting their spending for a
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future time period than for a discrete event. Thus I expected participants would report focusing
more on financial goals to predict spending for the target week than for the target birthday, and
that their goal focus would be linked to lower spending estimates for the week but not for the
birthday.
Method
Participants. One-hundred and thirty-eight undergraduate students completed the initial
questionnaire and all except four also completed the follow-up questionnaire, resulting in a final
sample of 134 students (83 females) between 18 and 22 years old (Mage = 18.60, SD = .81).
Procedure. Students were recruited from introductory psychology classes to complete
two online questionnaires concerning their personal finances, and participated in one of two
prediction target groups: They were asked to predict either their spending for the upcoming week
or their spending for an upcoming birthday celebration. Participants in the week target group
were asked to predict as accurately as possible their spending for the coming week: "How much
money do you think you will spend next week (i.e., the next seven days; all expenses included
except things that occur only once a month such as rent)?" Participants in the birthday target
group were first asked to nominate a person they knew with a birthday in the next two months, to
indicate their relationship with the person, and to list the person's initials and birth date
(Appendix F). Participants nominated friends in = 43), family members (n = 14), romantic
partners (n = 5), and casual acquaintances (n = 3). Participants were then asked to predict as
accurately as possible how much money they would spend for the birthday celebration: "Please
estimate, to the best of your ability, how much money you will spend on the birthday of (initial).
Please include all costs of the celebration (e.g. transportation cost, gifts, drinks)." Next, to assess
their focus on financial goals, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they had
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thought about their goals and intentions concerning future expenses (1 = Not at All, 7 = Very
Much) when making their predictions. Participants in the birthday target group completed an
additional item that asked them to rate the extent to which they had thought about their feelings
toward the birthday celebrant (1 = Not at All, 7 = Very Much).
A second online questionnaire was emailed to participants the day following the target
week (i.e., 8 days after the first questionnaire) or the day following'the nominated birthday {M =
25.36 days after the first questionnaire, SD = 17.72). Participants were asked to report how much
money they actually spent for the target week or target birthday using the same instructions as in
the initial questionnaire.
Results
Predicted and actual spending. The measures of predicted and actual spending were
submitted to a 2 (spending measure: predicted vs. actual) by 2 (prediction target: week vs.
birthday) ANOVA. A main effect of spending measure revealed that predicted spending was
significantly lower than actual spending, F(l, 132) = 7.84, p < .01. A main effect of the
prediction target indicated, not surprisingly, that spending was higher for an entire week than for
a birthday celebration, F(\, 132) = 56.64, p < .001 (Table 8). More importantly, these effects
were qualified by a significant spending measure by target interaction, F(\, 132) = 13.53,/? <
.001. Participants predicted to spend less in an upcoming week (M= 130.22, SD = 105.27) than
they actually spent during that week (M= 173.50, SD = 105.81), f(68) = 3.59,p = .001, d= .41,
whereas their predicted spending for the birthday celebration (M= 59.69, SD = 50.15) did not
differ from their actual birthday spending (M= 53.82, SD = 45.00), t(64) = -.16, p = .25, d= -.12.
Predicted and actual spending were significantly correlated for the target week, r(63) = .64, p <
.001, and the birthday celebration, r(63) = .64, p < .001.
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Focus on goals. I next examined participants' reports of the extent to which they focused
on their financial goals to generate their predictions. Participants reported that they focused more
on goals to predict spending for the week (M= 4.08, SD = 2.11) than for the birthday celebration
(M= 2.54, SD = 1.69), f(136) = 4.69,p < .001, d= .80. In addition, correlational analyses
indicated that participants who focused more on goals predicted to spend less money for the
target week, r(71) = -.34, p < .01, but not for the birthday celebration, r(63) = .03,;? = .82. These
correlations differed significantly, z = 2.17,/? = .03. The focus on goals at the time of prediction
was not correlated with actual spending for either the target week, r(71) = -.02,p = .85, or the
birthday celebration, r(63) = -.06,p = .66.
I next performed a multiple regression analysis (separately for each spending target)
wherein predicted spending was regressed first on actual spending (step 1) and then also on the
focus on goals (step 2), to test whether the focus on goals was linked to prediction bias. The
regression for the target week indicated that, after controlling for actual spending, the focus on
goals was still related to spending predictions,^ = -.33, t(66) = -3.47, p < .01, d= -.85. For the
birthday target, in contrast, the focus on goals remained unrelated to spending predictions after
controlling for actual spending,y? = .01, t{62) = .05,p = .96, d = .01. Notably, an additional
analysis that regressed predicted spending (controlling for actual spending) on the spending
target (0 = birthday, 1 = week), the focus on goals, and their interaction revealed a significant
interaction effect, fi = .46, /(129) = 2.66, p = .01, d- Al. This finding provides further evidence
that the link between focusing on goals and prediction bias differed depending on the target of
prediction.
Recall that participants in the birthday target group also reported the extent to which they
focused on their feelings for the birthday celebrant. These participants reported focusing more
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strongly on their feelings for the birthday celebrant (M= 5.32, SD = 1.58) than on their savings
goals (Af = 2.54, SD = 1.69), /(64) = 9.08, p <.00l,d=

1.67. Moreover, the reported focus on

feelings was correlated positively with predicted spending: People who focused more on their
feelings predicted to spend more on the birthday celebration, r(63) = .44,/? < 00. The focus on
feelings was also correlated positively with actual spending, r(63) = .46, p < .001. Consequently,
an analysis that regressed predicted spending on the focus on feelings (controlling for actual
spending) did not reveal a significant link between focus on feelings and prediction bias, fi = .18,
t{62) - 1.66,/? = .10. In other words, focus on feelings for the birthday celebrant influenced
predicted and actual spending equally and thus did not produce bias.
Discussion
Consistent with the hypotheses, participants exhibited an underestimation bias for weekly
spending predictions (as in Studies 1 -4) but did not give biased estimates of how much they
would spend for a specific upcoming event. In addition, participants reported focusing more on
their financial goals to predict their spending for a week than to predict their spending for a
discrete event. The tendency to focus on goals was also linked to lower (and thus more biased)
spending estimates for the upcoming week but not for an upcoming event. The findings are
generally consistent with the previous evidence that people underestimate their spending for
future time periods because their goals and intentions to minimize future spending (i.e., savings
goals) have a greater impact on prediction than on actual behavior. However the findings suggest
that the biasing effect of savings goals may not be applicable to predictions for discrete future
events.
It is important to note, however, that the target event in the present study (i.e., a birthday
celebration) might be one for which people are particularly unlikely to consider savings goals,
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because birthday gifts might be perceived as expression of regard and liking for another person.
Indeed for birthday celebrations people might be motivated to believe they will spend money
freely and generously. Thus it is important to test the generalizability of the findings to a wider
range of discrete target events, including events where there could be more motivation to
minimize spending. It is also worth noting that, unlike the previous studies, the present study did
not measure people's savings goals directly (indeed, participants financial goals could have
included spending money rather than saving money) and examine how these goals related to
prediction bias. Instead participants provided self reports of how much they had focused,
broadly, on financial goals, and this focus did not necessarily involve a goal to reduce or
minimize their expenditures.
Study 6
This study provided another test of the hypothesis that people tend to make relatively
unbiased estimates of the amount of money they will spend for a future event compared to
estimates of spending for a future time period. Participants were again asked to predict spending
for either a specific event or for the next week. To ensure that the study included a wide range of
target events, the participants themselves nominated events that would be occurring within the
next week and then predicted spending for those events. Also, importantly, I recruited a
community sample for this study rather than a student sample, to test whether the effects
generalize to a more sample including different occupations. Study 6 also examined the role of
savings goals in predictions more directly by measuring participants' pre-existing savings goals
at the beginning of the study, and then examining the link between these savings goals and
prediction (As in Studies 2-4). This procedure allowed me to test whether there is a differential
relation between savings goals and prediction as a function of the prediction target.
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Method
Participants. The sample consisted of 61 participants (48 female) between 18 and 58
years (Mage = 34.23 years, SD = 10.63). Participants were recruited through online research
sites and snowball recruiting techniques, and were compensated with an entry in a lottery for
$100. The majority of participants reported working in an office setting (n = 22), and other
occupations included nurses, police officers, programmers, students, social workers, and stay-athome parents.
Procedure. Participants completed two online questionnaires. They first completed a
questionnaire concerning their general attitudes and beliefs toward spending and saving money.
Embedded in this questionnaire was a single item used to assess savings goals as in Studies 2-4:
Participants rated their agreement with the statement that, in general, saving money was
important for them (1 = Disagree Completely, 7 = Agree Completely). Participants also rated the
extent to which they agreed that: in general money was important, they often thought about how
to spend their money, and they knew exactly what they spend their money on. As in the previous
studies, these supplementary items were included primarily to reduce the salience of the savings
goal item. Next participants were randomly assigned to the event or the week prediction target.
For the week target, participants were asked to predict their spending for the next week: "How
much money do you think you will spend next week (i.e., the next seven days; all expenses
included except things that occur only once a month such as rent)?" For the event target,
participants were first asked to nominate and briefly describe an event that would occur in the
next 7 days and would involve spending money (see Appendix G). Participants nominated target
events such as shopping trips, (n = 17), movies or shows (n = 9), birthday celebrations (n = 7),
and expenses related to driving (n = 4). Participants were then asked predict their spending for
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the event ("Include all expenses associated with this event, those that you need to buy before the
event starts, and those you need to buy during the event").
Immediately after making their prediction, participants were asked to describe their
thoughts leading up to the prediction. Two research assistants coded the open ended responses
for whether participants had spontaneously referred to a savings goal (i.e., a desire to reduce or
minimize their spending). Examples included: "I need to watch where I spend every penny"; "I
try to set a weekly expense limit". The responses were also coded for whether participants
mentioned concrete purchase items (e.g., "I need to buy shoes for a wedding") rather than
discussing their expenses at a more abstract level. Initial inter-rater agreement was 80% for
savings goals and 87% for concrete items, and disagreements were resolved by discussion.
In the second questionnaire, one week later, participants were asked to report how much
money they actually spent for the target week or the target event, using the same instructions as
in the first questionnaire.
Results
Predicted and actual spending. The measures of predicted and actual spending were
submitted to a 2(spending measure: predicted vs. actual) by 2(spending target: week vs. event)
ANOVA.5 A main effect of the spending target indicated that spending was higher for the week
than for the single event, F(\, 59) = 6.23, p = .02 (Table 9). A main effect of spending measure
indicated that predicted spending was significantly lower than actual spending, F(l, 59) = 3.89, p
= .05. More importantly, the analysis again revealed a spending target by measure interaction,
F(], 59) = 5.56,p = .02. This interaction indicates that, consistent with the hypotheses,
participants underestimated their actual spending for the week but not for a single event.
Participants predicted to spend $202.94 (SD = 188.89) in the next week, but actually spent
$285.58 (SD = 233.00), t(3\) = -2.46,p =.02, d=-.30. In contrast, participants predicted to spend
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$118.91 (SD = 180.54) for an individual event, and actually spent $113.31 (SD = 157.41), /(28) =
.49,/? = .63, d= .03.
The role of saving goals. A preliminary examination of the savings goals rating item
indicated that, in general, participants thought it was important to be saving money (M = 5.46,
SD = 1.72, on a 7-point scale), and their rated agreement with the savings goals item did not
differ across spending target conditions, t(59) = .25,p = .80, d = .07. Correlational analyses were
then performed (separately for each target group) to examine the relation between participants'
rated savings goals and spending predictions (Table 10). For the target week, as hypothesized,
saving goals were correlated negatively with predicted spending, r(30) = -.44,/? = .01. That is,
participants who endorsed a savings goal more strongly predicted to spend less money. For the
target event, saving goals were not significantly correlated with predicted spending, r(27) = -.15,
p = .42. Rated savings goals were not correlated significantly with actual spending for the target
event, r(27) = -.08,/? = .67. However, savings goals were (marginally) related to actual weekly
spending, r(30) = -.33,/? = .07.
To examine the role of savings goals in prediction bias, I next performed a multiple
regression analysis as in Study 2, wherein predicted spending was regressed first on actual
spending (step 1) and then also on savings goals (step 2). In this study I also controlled for the
date of the session because data collection extended over a long period of time. For the target
week, spending predictions were related to actual spending, fi = .71, f(28) = 6.10,/? < .001, d =
2.31; however, even after controlling for actual spending the predictions were still linked to
savings goals, fi = -.23, /(28) = -1.95,/? = .06, d= -.74. Therefore, although this study was the
only instance across all studies in which savings goals were related to actual spending as well as
predicted spending, the underestimation bias was still larger among those with high savings goals
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than among those with low savings goals. For a target event, in contrast, spending predictions
were related only to actual spending,^ = .93, t(25) = 13.94,p < .001, d = 5.58, and not to savings
goals, fi = -.07, /(25) = -1.12,/? = .28, d = -.45. This pattern suggests that individuals with
stronger savings goals were more inclined to underestimate their spending for an upcoming week
but not for a single, concrete event (see Figure 3).
Notably, an additional analysis that regressed predicted spending on the spending target
(0 = birthday, 1 = week), savings goals, and their interaction term, controlling for actual
spending, did not reveal a significant interaction effect. The study might be underpowered to
detect such an effect, yet caution is warranted in concluding that the link between savings goals
and prediction bias differed for weeks vs. events. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of results is
similar to that of Study 5, and consistent with the proposal that savings goals contribute to an
underestimation bias for predictions concerning an upcoming week but not for predictions
concerning a single, concrete event.
Coding of open-ended responses. The open-ended thought coding revealed little focus
on savings goals overall: Only 10 people mentioned savings goals. Of these, one participant (3%)
was in the event condition and 9 participants (28%) were in the week condition,x (df= \,N =
61) = 6.76,/? = .009. Furthermore, those participants who predicted spending for an event were
more likely to mention concrete items (« = 19, 66%) than participants predicting spending for the
entire week (n = 10, 35%),x2(df=

\,N= 61) = 5.90,p = .02. Exploratory analyses also revealed

that among the subset of participants who mentioned concrete purchases in the open ended
thought listing for their weekly prediction, savings goals did not correlate significantly with
predicted spending, r(9) = -.01,/? = .97, and did not determine prediction bias, fi = .01, t(l) = .03,
p = .98, respectively. In contrast, for those who did not mention concrete items, savings goals
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correlated strongly with predicted spending, r(19) = .59, p = .01, and determined prediction bias,
J2 = -.23, r( 17) = -1.76,/? = .09.
Discussion
Consistent with the hypothesis, this study again found that spending predictions for an
upcoming week were biased whereas predictions for concrete future events were not. The bias in
weekly spending predictions replicates previous findings, and is particularly notable because this
was the first study to examine spending predictions in a community based sample compared to
the student samples examined previously. It appears that even individuals with more lifeexperience and a wider scope of monetary resources and responsibilities tend to underestimate
their future weekly spending, just like undergraduate students (Studies 1-5; Ulkumen et al.,
2008). In addition, the absence of bias for event spending predictions extends the findings of
Study 5 to a much broader range of target events.
The study also provided additional support for the hypotheses concerning the role of
savings goals in prediction bias. Participants' tendency to underestimate their expenses for a
future week was related to their pre-existing savings goals, as in Studies 2-4, but savings goals
were not a significant determinant of predictions for discrete events. This pattern replicates the
findings of Study 5 and enhances the convergent validity of the findings by using an alternative
methodological approach. Whereas participants in Study 5 reported how much they focused on
financial goals during prediction, participants in this study reported their general savings goals
prior to prediction. The present study showed that savings goals assessed prior to prediction are
linked to predictions for time periods but not for events. This pattern is consistent with the
proposal that people place more weight on their savings goals - and thus become more prone to a
desirability bias - when predicting spending for time periods than when predicting spending for
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future events. Notably, this study also showed a marginal association between savings goals and
actual spending for those predicting their weekly spending. This association might be due to the
wider range in income in this community sample than in the previous student samples. For
example, low SES participants might be more motivated to save than high SES participants and
they might also be more restricted in how much they can spend compared to high SES
participants. It may seem surprising that participants did not mention savings goals more often in
the open ended responses. One reason for this is that participants did not write much overall, in
fact many claimed they did not know how they arrived at their prediction. There were no other
consistent themes apart from savings goals that were mentioned. It is also important to note that
a substantial proportion of participants in the weekly condition did mentioned savings goals
(about 1 in 3). This proportion was much higher than the proportion of people mentioning
savings goals in the event condition, which is consistent with my theorizing.
Study 7
In the next and final study I sought to address a number of potential procedural concerns
with the previous studies. First, to enhance the convergent validity of our findings relating goals
and predictions, I obtained both participants' self-reports of their focus on financial goals (as in
Study 5), and I also assessed their pre-existing savings goals (as in Study 2, 3, and 6). Second,
participants' savings goals were measured well in advance of their spending predictions (as in
Study 3), to rule out the possibility of demand characteristics due to measuring goals and
predictions in close temporal proximity. Third, I obtained reports of actual spending using more
proximal self-report measures that should be less susceptible to memory bias: Weekly spending
was assessed through daily diaries and event spending was assessed the day after the event
(rather than at the end of 7 days as in Study 6).
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The main and central objective of this study was to introduce, an intervention that has
potential to attenuate the underestimation bias for weekly spending predictions. Recall that I
have proposed, and found, that spending predictions for discrete events should be less prone to
the desirability bias that characterizes predictions for future time periods. Thus, it seems
plausible that asking forecasters to break down a future time period into a series of discrete,
individual events might help to eliminate or attenuate prediction bias. To test this hypothesis, I
instructed some participants to generate a list of the concrete expenses they will incur in the
coming week before predicting their overall spending for the week.
I expected that this procedure would focus people's attention on the concrete events in
their lives that would require them to spend money, and thereby detract from a tendency to base
predictions on financial goals and desires that may otherwise be salient at the time of prediction.
Thus 1 hypothesized that, for weekly predictions, the manipulation would attenuate the
underestimation bias because it would reduce people's reliance on savings goals. For event
predictions, in contrast, I did not expect this effect. The discrete spending events that I examine
are already concrete and specific - that is they are already relatively "unpacked". Also, our
previous studies imply that, even when left to their own devices, people place little weight on
their savings goals to predict event spending. Thus I did not expect any further reduction in
predicted spending or reliance on savings goals when target events were broken down into more
specific components.
Unpacking Procedures in the Literature
Relevant to my proposed accuracy intervention, there is a larger literature discussing the
benefits of considering task components prior to judgments about the task. Support theory
(Tversky & Koehler, 1994) suggests that considering subcategories (rather than only a
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superordinate category) can influence the perceived probability of an event: for example, if
"death due to natural causes" is unpacked into subcomponents ("death due to heart disease",
"death due to cancer", etc), the subjective probability of the event "death due to natural causes"
increases. The implications of support theory are not limited to judgments of probability;
considering an event's subcomponents might change people's perception of the event in various
ways. In decision analysis research, a similar technique called decomposition has been shown to
improve fact estimation accuracy (Armstrong et al., 1975; Connolly & Dean, 1997; MacGregor
& Lichtenstein, 1991; Kleinmuntz, 1990). Decomposition techniques prompt the forecaster to
make many small, simple judgments which are then mathematically integrated to arrive at a
larger complex judgment. A related approach, segmentation of individual task components, has
been applied to project completion time forecasts, with mixed results (Byram, 1997; Forsyth &
Burt, 2008). Considering three individual components of a computer assembly task did not
reduce the optimistic time prediction bias (Byram, 1997) whereas segmenting a multi-component
office-work task (proofread, order documents, deliver letters) into its six components prior to
prediction did eliminate optimistic bias in completion time prediction (Forsyth & Burt, 2008).
Notably, these techniques require components to be broken down in advance rather than
allowing participants to self-generate subcomponents — a procedure that would be unpractical for
spending forecasts because purchases differ widely between people and there is no one correct
solution. Therefore, a similar technique labeled unpacking (Kruger & Evans, 2004) might most
resemble the procedure of considering individual, personalized events prior to a week spending
prediction.
The unpacking procedure has been introduced in the domain of time predictions and
involves listing subcomponents of a project without making separate predictions for each
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component (Kruger & Evans, 20Q4), and has been demonstrated to increase prediction accuracy.
For example, a subset of participants who considered the details of their Christmas shopping
(listing each person and each present) before predicting when they would complete their
shopping predicted to finish later than those who did not consider the details of their Christmas
shopping. Similarly, participants who listed the individual steps involved in a document
formatting task predicted to finish this task later than participants who did not list individual
steps. Actual completion time did not differ and thus participants who had unpacked the task
were less optimistically biased than those in the control group. The proposed event-thinking
intervention resembles Kruger and Evan's (2004) unpacking procedure most closely: participants
will list individual spending events prior to making an overall weekly spending prediction. The
hypothesized effect of the unpacking procedure is in line with previously documented effects of
unpacking for time predictions: I expect that spending predictions will become more accurate
when unpacked prior to generating the prediction. In addition, my novel prediction in the context
of spending forecasts is that this unpacking effect should be mediated by a reduced focus on
goals when generating the spending prediction.
Method
Participants. Of an initial sample of 149 undergraduate students, 26 participants missed
more than two diary entries and 8 participants failed to complete the event followup survey and
were therefore excluded.6 The final sample consisted of 115 participants (73 female) between 17
and 33 years (Mage = 18.47, SD = 1.67).
Procedure. Participants in this study completed measures at several time points. First, at
the beginning of the academic term, participants completed an item assessing their savings goals
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as part of a larger prescreen questionnaire (as in Study 3). On average, participants completed the
savings goal item 20.46 days (SD = 14.22) before the first session of the study.
In the first session of the study, participants were asked to predict their spending for
either the next week or a self-nominated event, as in previous studies. Participants in the event
target condition nominated events such as going out for dinner with friends (n = 20), movies or
shows {n = 16), festivals or parties (n = 7), grocery shopping or mall shopping {n — 6), trips {n =
6), birthday celebrations {n = 2), and expenses related to driving (n - 1). In addition, participants
were randomly assigned to an unpacking or control condition.7 In the unpacking condition,
participants were asked to generate an itemized list of all the individual expenses they would
incur during the next week (or for the target event) before making their overall spending
prediction (See Appendix H for the Unpacking manipulation). Participants in the control
condition were not asked to generate the itemized list before making their prediction. However,
to control for potential effects of unpacking on actual spending, control participants generated
this list at the end of the session (i.e., after their prediction had been made).
Participants were also asked to report the extent to which they based their spending
prediction on financial goals. They rated the extent to which they agreed (1 = Disagree
Completely, 7 = Agree Completely) that they had based their prediction on "how much money I
ideally want to spend" and on "how much money I want to save in the long term". These two
ratings correlated positively, r(l 13) = .38,/? < .001, and were averaged to create an index of
participants' self-reported focus on financial goals (see Appendix I and J, respectively, for the
complete thought focus scales, and Table 13 and 14 for additional analyses for all thought focus
items).
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In the second part of the study, actual spending was assessed. Participants in the event
condition were contacted by email the day after their nominated event, reminded of the event,
and asked to complete an online follow-up questionnaire. In this questionnaire, participants listed
their purchases for and during the target event and reported how much they had spent overall for
the event. Participants in the weekly condition completed a spending diary during the target
week: At the end of each day they accessed an online survey to report their spending for that day.
Participants did not receive daily reminders and consequently they sometimes missed entries.
Those who missed only one entry (n = 15) or two entries in = 6) were included in the sample and
the missing values were replaced by the mean of the remaining entries. Those who missed more
than two entries were excluded (see participants section). I summed the daily reports to arrive at
the measure of actual spending for the target week.
Results
Predicted and actual spending. First, to determine whether the difference in prediction
bias across prediction targets (week vs. event) observed in Study 5 and 6 was replicated, I
conducted a 2(spending measure: predicted vs. actual) by 2(prediction target: week vs. event)
ANOVA using only the participants in the control condition. Once again, the spending measure
by prediction target interaction was significant, F(l, 54) = 4.22,/? = .05, indicating that, left to
their own devices, participants underestimated future spending for an upcoming week, paired
r(26) = -2.27,/? < .03, d = -.48, but not for a discrete event, t(28) = -1.30,/? = .21 d = -.09.
Next, to examine the effects of the unpacking manipulation on prediction bias, I
conducted a 2(condition: unpacking vs. control) by 2(spending measure: predicted vs. actual)
ANOVA separately for the participants assigned to a week and event target (see Table 11 for
means). For the week target, the ANOVA revealed only the hypothesized spending measure by
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condition interaction effect, F(l, 53) = 3.93,p - .05. Control participants predicted to spend
$112.41 (SD = 72.63) in the next week and actually spent $150.45 (SD = 86.29). Participants
who unpacked the week into events prior to prediction predicted to spend $165.54 (SD = 95.83)
and actually spent $159.42 (SD = 93.67). As expected, participants underestimated their
spending in the control condition, t(26) = -2.27, p < .03, d= -.48, but not in the unpacking
condition, t(27) = .42,/? = .68, d = .06. Furthermore, predicted spending was higher in the
unpacking condition than in the control condition, /(53) = -2.31,/? = .03, d = -.63, whereas actual
spending was not affected by the manipulation, /(58) = -.37,p = .71, d= -.10. This pattern of
results suggests that the tendency to underestimate spending for an upcoming week was
eliminated by instructing participants to unpack their spending for the time period into discrete
spending events prior to prediction.
For the target event, in contrast, the ANOVA did not yield any significant main effects or
interaction effect. Control participants predicted to spend $45.32 (SD = 40.38) for the nominated
event and actually spent $49.44 (SD = 45.54). Participants who unpacked the event further prior
to prediction predicted to spend $60.71 (SD = 71.46) and actually spent $54.91 (SD = 58.74).
Participants did not underestimate their spending significantly in either the control condition,
/(28) = -1.30, p = .21, d= -.09, or the unpacking condition, /(30) = .90,/? = .38, d= .09. Thus, as
hypothesized, when participants were already making a prediction about a discrete spending
event (and generating unbiased predictions), asking them to break the event into smaller
components did not alter prediction significantly.
The role of goals. Next I sought to examine the role of goals in producing the effects
described above. I have hypothesized that people rely more heavily on savings goals to predict
their spending for a future time period than for a discrete event, and that this difference would be
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attenuated by the unpacking manipulation. I tested these hypotheses in two ways: by comparing
the relation between pre-measured savings goals and predictions across condition, and by
examining participants' self-reports of how much they had focused on financial goals to generate
their prediction.
Pre-measured savings goals. A preliminary ANOVA confirmed that savings goals,
assessed prior to the experiment, did not differ significantly across the experimental conditions.
In general, participants believed it was important to be saving money (M = 5.50, SD = 1.49 on a
7-point scale).
To test the hypotheses, I first examined the correlation between savings goals and
predicted spending within each condition (Table 12). Consistent with the hypotheses, there was a
significant correlation between savings goals and predicted spending in only the week-control
condition: Participants who endorsed savings goals more strongly predicted to spend less money
in the upcoming week, r(24) = -.44,p = .03. Savings goals were not related to predicted spending
in the event-control condition, r(21) = A5,p = .44, the week-unpacking condition, r(26) = .12,;?
= .55, or the event-unpacking condition, r(29) = .20, p = .29.
To further examine the role of savings goals in prediction bias, I performed regression
analyses, wherein predicted spending was regressed first on actual spending (step 1) and then
also on savings goals (step 2). Within each condition, participants' spending predictions were
related strongly to their actual spending:^ ranged from .50 to .94. More importantly, even after
controlling for actual spending, savings goals were significantly related to predicted spending in
the week-control condition,^ = -.36, t(23) = -2.28,p = .03. That is, the participants who
endorsed savings goals more strongly were more inclined to underestimate their actual spending
for the week. In contrast, participants' savings goals were not a significant determinant of bias in
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the week-unpacked condition,fi = -.12, /(25) = -.78,p= .44, the event-control condition,/? = .12,
/(26) = \.ll,p

= .09, or the event-unpacked condition, fi = -.03, r(28) = -21,p=

.78. Figure 4

depicts the relation between savings goals and prediction bias in each condition.
Notably, an additional analysis that regressed predicted spending (controlling for actual
spending) on the prediction target (0 = week, 1 = event), savings goals, unpacking condition (0 =
control, 1 = unpacking), and the interactions among these variables revealed a marginally
significant three way interaction,/J = -.18, t(\§6) = -1.78,/? < .08. Overall, the pattern of findings
was generally consistent with results from Study 6: in the control conditions, savings goals
contributed to bias in predictions for an upcoming week but not for an event. Additionally, the
findings were consistent with the idea that the biasing effect of savings goals on weekly
predictions can be attenuated by an unpacking manipulation.
Self-reported focus on financial goals. To test whether the experimental manipulations
influenced participants' self-reported focus on their financial goals, I submitted the index of goal
focus to a 2(prediction target: event vs. week) by 2(condition: unpacking vs. control) ANOVA.
The analysis revealed only a target by condition interaction, F(l, 111) = 7.72,p < .01, and an
examination of the relevant means and subsequent contrasts yielded considerable support for the
hypotheses. In the control conditions, as in Study 5, participants reported focusing more on their
financial goals to generate predictions for an upcoming week (M= 4.96, SD = 1.27) than for an
event (M= 3.78, SD = 1.47), t(\ 11) = 4.39,p < .01; however, in the unpacking condition the
focus on goals did not differ for predictions concerning a week (M= 3.84, SD = 1.43) and an
event (M= 4.15, SD = 1.55), t(\ 11) = 1.15,/? = .13. Furthermore, participants reported focusing
more on their financial goals in the weekly control condition (M= 4.96, SD - 1.27) than in the
weekly unpacking condition (M= 3.84, SD = 1.43), t(\ 11) = 4.17,/? < .01. In contrast, the focus
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on goals did not differ significantly across the event control (M= 3.78, SD = 1.47) and event
unpacking condition (M= 4.15, SD = 1.55), t(l 11) = -1.38,p = .09.
Next, I conducted a multiple regression analysis (separately for each spending target)
using only the participants in the control conditions, in order to examine, as in Study 5, the link
between the reported focus on goals and the bias in spending predictions. Predicted spending was
regressed first on actual spending (step 1) and then also on the focus on goals (step 2), to test
whether the focus on goals was linked to prediction bias. The regression for the target week
indicated that, after controlling for actual spending, the focus on goals was still related to
spending predictions,^ = -.34, t(52) = -3.17,p < .01, d = .88. For the event target, in contrast, the
focus on goals remained unrelated to spending predictions after controlling for actual spending,^
= .04, /(57) = .56,p - .58, d = .15. An additional analysis that regressed predicted spending
(controlling for actual spending) on the spending target (0 = week, 1 = event), the focus on goals,
and their interaction revealed a significant interaction effect,y? = .52, /(l 10) = 2.85,/? = .01, d =
.54. These effects replicate the findings of Study 5. A similar multiple regression analysis using
only the participants in the unpacking conditions revealed no significant interaction effect,/? =
.06, p = .50, and no main effects of savings goals or prediction target (fs = -.03 and -.11,
respectively).
Mediation model of thought focus. I next wanted to examine whether the effect of the
unpacking manipulation on prediction was explained by a reduced focus on savings goals.
Because participants' general savings goals were measured far in advance of the experimental
session they cannot be influenced by the experimental manipulation. However, the unpacking
procedure might have affected how much people focused on their goals during prediction. I
performed mediation analyses separately for each prediction target. In each case I regressed
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participants' goal focus on the unpacking condition (0 = control, 1 = unpacking), and I also
regressed predicted spending first on goal focus and then also on the unpacking condition (see
Figure 5 for the mediation model and standardized coefficients).
For the one week target, participants reported focusing less on financial goals in the
unpacking condition than in the control condition, /(53) = -3.08,p = .003, d = -.85, and a reduced
focus on goals was, in turn, linked to higher spending predictions (controlling for condition),
/(52) = -2.69, p = .01, d = .75. This pattern indicates that the degree of focus on goals was a
mediator of the effect of unpacking on weekly spending predictions, Sobel z = 2.03, p = .04
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). This pattern of mediation was unaffected if I also controlled for actual
spending in the regressions (i.e., the effect of condition on predicted spending, controlling actual
spending, dropped from^ = .28 to/3 = .17 when goal focus was entered in the model, Sobel z =
1.88, p = .05).
For the event spending predictions, in contrast, the unpacking manipulation did not affect
focus on goals, ?(58) = .94, p = .35, d = .23, and the focus on goals was not related to spending
predictions (controlling for condition), t(51) = -A0,p = .69, d= -.11, Sobel z = 0.36, p = .71.
This pattern of effects remained unaffected if I also controlled for actual spending (i.e., the effect
of condition on predicted spending, controlling actual spending, was not significant,;? = .09, and
did not change when goal focus was entered in the model, fi = .08, Sobel z = 0.36, p = .71).
Discussion
The findings offered support for each of the guiding hypotheses. First, there was further
evidence that people are more inclined to underestimate their future spending for time periods
than for specific events. As in the previous studies, participants underestimated how much they
would spend in the next week, but were unbiased in predicting their spending for concrete
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spending events. Second, the difference in prediction bias across targets (week vs. event) was
again linked to a differential focus on financial goals. Participants appeared to rely more heavily
on savings goals to predict their spending for a future week than for a future event, and a greater
focus on savings goals was associated with spending predictions that were lower and more prone
to bias. Note that this finding was foreshadowed in Study 6, where the interaction between
prediction target and spending measure did not quite reach significance. In Study 6, the
association between savings goals and prediction bias was somewhat, but not significantly,
stronger for the weekly predictions than for the event predictions. In the present study, these
links were significantly different - possibly due to more sensitive measures and a larger sample
size. The results of the goal focus measure also suggest that participants were aware of the extent
to which their savings goals contributed to their predictions. Participants reported basing their
predictions on their financial goals to a greater extent when predicting weekly spending rather
than event spending.
Third, this study showed that when weekly spending predictions were unpacked into
concrete spending events, participants' thoughts and predictions resembled those in the event
prediction conditions, eliminating the bias in weekly spending predictions. Furthermore, as
hypothesized, the de-biasing effect of the unpacking manipulation was mediated by a reduced
focus on savings goals. Notably, the unpacking procedure did not change thoughts or predictions
for the event prediction condition, arguably because participants predicting their spending for a
specific event are already in an unpacked mindset.
General Discussion
In everyday life, people estimate their spending for projects and time periods. A person
might try to estimate how much she will spend during the next week or she might try to estimate
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her spending specifically for an upcoming event, such as a birthday party. The present research
examines personal spending predictions in a series of seven studies, and results supported the
three initial hypotheses. A summary of predicted and actual spending across all studies is
presented in Table 15.
First, I found that people tended to underestimate their future personal spending when
forecasting time periods, predicting that they would spend substantially less money during an
upcoming week than they actually did. On average, participants underestimated their weekly
expenditures by 27%. However, concrete spending events appeared to be exempted from the
optimistic bias in spending predictions; participants were remarkably accurate in predicting their
spending across a wide variety of concrete future purchases (birthday shopping, self-nominated
events).
Second, I demonstrated that one source of bias in weekly spending predictions is people's
savings goals - defined as the general desire to save money or minimize future spending - at the
time of prediction. Participants who reported stronger savings goals (Studies 2, 3, 6, and 7) or
were induced experimentally to experience stronger savings goals (Study 4) predicted they
would spend less money in a future week. Because savings goals were not related significantly to
participants' actual spending they contributed to prediction bias. Somewhat ironically, then, the
very individuals who were more motivated to regulate their future personal spending were also
most inclined to generate unrealistic spending predictions. Notably, savings goals were not
correlated with predicted spending when people were predicting their spending for a future event.
This disconnect between goals and prediction might contribute to prediction accuracy for event
spending predictions.
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Third, I demonstrated that people can be induced to make more accurate spending
predictions for a future week, by considering the individual spending events and expense details
that they will encounter during a week (Study 7). This unpacking procedure appears to be
successful because it reduces reliance on savings goals during prediction, and thus attenuates the
biasing influence of goals.
Bias in Spending Predictions
Anecdotally, it appears that overspending is pervasive. However, to my knowledge, this
is the first program of psychological research to systematically compare predicted and actual
spending, and the documented bias has widespread implications. From a practical standpoint, the
prediction bias is important because, as noted previously, people base many life decisions on a
consideration of future expenditures. Unrealistic expectations could be costly, resulting in
unwise decisions or serious financial problems such as overspending, excessive debt, and the
experience of financial stress. The effect size of the prediction bias for weekly spending ranged
from .41 to 1.09 (control conditions), which can be characterized as medium to large effects
(Cohen, 1992). From a theoretical standpoint, the finding extends literature on self prediction to
an understudied domain. The spending prediction bias is an instance of overly optimistic
prediction, and contributes to theoretical discussions about the prevalence and nature of
optimistically biased prediction (Armor & Taylor, 1998; Carroll et al., 2006; Dunning, 2007).
Previous findings indicate that the optimistic bias that characterizes many predictions is often
reduced or eliminated in settings in which optimistic forecasts could be openly disconfirmed,
such as when outcomes can be evaluated in the near future (e.g., Shepperd et al., 1996) and when
performance tasks are real as opposed to hypothetical (e.g., Armor & Sackett, 2006). Some
aspects of our findings are consistent with this pattern: the bias in spending predictions was

smaller for daily than weekly predictions. However, the robust bias found for weekly spending
predictions suggests that optimistic biases can emerge even in important, naturalistic domains in
which prediction outcomes can be readily verified. Strikingly, even though participants were
aware that they had spent more in the past week, they persisted in optimistically predicting to
spend less in the next week, and continued to do so even after their expectations had been
disconfirmed (e.g., Study 1 and 4). A challenge for future research will be to assess whether
factors that moderate optimism in other domains (e.g., temporal proximity, perceived
importance, accountability) also moderate the bias in predicted spending.
It is also important to note that the present studies did not show optimistic bias across all
personal spending predictions. Predictions for concrete events (Studies 5-7) and predictions for
daily spending (Study 2) were remarkably accurate. One of the distinctions between event and
daily spending on the one hand and weekly spending on the other hand is the level of complexity
or number of components of spending. Thus, accuracy may be determined by the number of
subcomponents of the prediction target. Simple, few-component targets may be predicted
accurately and complex, many-component targets may be underestimated. Given that weekly
predictions include many components and are relatively complex, this account is consistent with
the underestimation evident for weekly spending predictions. Some types of spending events
might be as abstract and complex as weekly predictions and might therefore be underestimated.
This reasoning might help to explain the cost overruns that occur for major construction projects
(Hall, 1980; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002), which are highly complex and multifaceted. However, the
present studies suggest that the reason for prediction accuracy is not only due to cognitive
mechanisms (such as ease of processing for simple targets) but that savings goals play a large
role. Reliance on savings goals was an important source of bias for weekly spending predictions
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and the attenuation of the goal-prediction link was a source of accuracy for event spending
predictions.
An interesting question that remains is whether predictions for a longer time frame (e.g.,
the coming month or year) would be more or less prone to bias. One could easily expect, for the
reasons previously noted, that the magnitude of bias would continue to increase with longer time
frames. On the other hand, the longer time frames may be less prone to bias because they include
more fixed and recurring expenditures (e.g., monthly rent) that may be easy to predict than
discretionary spending. In a preliminary investigation of this issue, I have found that prediction
bias was less pronounced for monthly predictions (18% underestimation) than for weekly
predictions. Conceivably, then, the weekly time frame is uniquely prone to bias because it is
long enough to minimize concerns with verifiability, but short enough to exclude easily predicted
recurring expenses. This hypothesis awaits further research.
An additional cognitive difference between predictions for events and time periods might
be the relative confidence in prediction. Ulkumen et al. (2008) argued that people who are less
confident about their spending predictions adjust these predictions upward. If people were less
confident about event spending predictions than weekly spending predictions, they might have
adjusted their predictions upward, predicting to spend more money. Thus, different levels of
confidence might be responsible for the difference in prediction bias for events and weeks. To
explore this possibility, I asked participants to rate how certain they were that their prediction
was accurate in most studies. There were no systematic differences in confidence about spending
predictions (or actual spending reports) across prediction targets. Table 16 shows the means of
these supplementary measures for all those studies that assessed confidence ratings.
The Role of Savings Goals
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The second main finding, that people's tendency to underestimate future spending
stemmed from their savings goals, sheds light on a motivational determinant of prediction bias.
The findings are generally consistent with previous theories suggesting that people's
expectations are colored by their current preferences and desires (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007;
Kunda, 1990). They also help to address several limitations in the relevant empirical evidence
identified in a recent literature review (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). Whereas previous research
has typically been correlational, the present studies included an experimental manipulation of
savings goals at the time of prediction and thus support a causal interpretation. Whereas previous
research has documented motivated reasoning processes within a wide variety of judgmental
domains (Kunda, 1990; Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989), the present studies focused specifically on
behavioral predictions which, arguably, could be relatively high in accuracy constraints and thus
relatively immune to bias. Finally, whereas research on the desirability bias has typically
examined people's predictions for outcomes that are beyond their control (Krizan & Windschitl,
2007), the present studies explored naturalistic, real world outcomes that are under the control
(or at least partial control) of the forecaster.
Although I characterized savings goals as a factor that is motivational in nature, I do not
wish to imply that the prediction bias was produced solely by motivational rather than cognitive
processes. In addition to the effects of savings goals there are likely to be numerous cognitive
processes that could themselves produce unrealistic spending estimates. For example, people
often generate predictions by constructing a scenario or mental simulation of how future events
will unfold (Dunning, 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Ross & Buehler, 2001), and this
approach leaves them prone to optimism for several reasons: they focus on central features of an
event without considering all the concrete subcomponents or details (e.g., Kruger & Evans,
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2002; Jergenson, 2004), they generate only a single or very limited number of scenarios without
appreciating the vast array of possibilities (e.g., Griffin et al., 1990; Newby-Clark, Ross,
Buehler, Koehler, & Griffin, 2000), and they focus narrowly on the target event itself and neglect
other influential events (e.g., Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). Such
cognitive processes produce highly optimistic and confident predictions in many domains
(Armor & Taylor, 1998; Buehler et al., 2002; Dunning, 2007) and could likewise result in a
tendency to underestimate future spending.
Also, the goal construct itself- defined as a cognitive representation of desired end states
- involves a blending of cognitive and motivational properties (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007).
Goals are imbued with motivational properties because they refer to desired end states, but they
also include cognitive representation of the plans and actions needed to reach that end state. Thus
the effects of savings goals on prediction could be attributable to either motivational or cognitive
properties. Furthermore, even when the effects of a goal on prediction are driven by motivation,
they are likely mediated by cognitive mechanisms, such as the selective search and evaluation of
evidence (Buehler et al., 1997; Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; Kunda, 1990). For example, Buehler
et al. demonstrated that the impact of people's desire to finish tasks early on their predicted
completion times was mediated by a selective focus on optimistic plans. In sum, people's savings
goals may elicit a host of cognitive mechanisms (e.g., a selective focus on optimistic scenarios)
that support a prediction of reduced spending. A challenge for future research will be to identify
the specific cognitive mechanisms that mediate the impact of savings goals on prediction.
Evidence for the role of savings goals also suggests boundary conditions of prediction
bias, which was indeed borne out in the data: People underestimated future spending only when
they endorsed savings goals strongly and when they relied on their savings goals. When
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predicting a concrete spending event, the influence of savings goals seemed to be attenuated,
resulting in more realistic forecasts. At the present stage of the research, I can only speculate as
to why savings goals are less influential in prediction for future events than for time periods.
One possibility is that thinking about concrete events calls to mind other goals (such as
the goal to enjoy oneself, to revive old friendships, make a partner happy). Having specific goals
on one's mind might suppress the activation of other (i.e., savings) goals (Shah & Kruglanski,
2002; Shah et al., 2002). If savings goals are not activated, they would not influence spending
predictions. In contrast, time periods may be construed more abstractly. When thinking about
future spending at a more abstract level, people might be influenced more by the desirability of
spending little money (Liberman & Trope, 1998) and thus base their prediction on savings goals.
A second possibility is that thinking of events activates goals that directly conflict with savings
goals (such as being fashionable, being generous, providing opportunities for one's children) and
that participants are aware of potential interference of these goals with their savings goals (or
they regard the conflicting goals as more important). Thus, even though savings goals are
activated, participants may base their prediction less on these goals because they are
overshadowed by other goals that require spending.
The Unpacking Intervention
The third main finding, that participants' weekly spending prediction became more
accurate if they unpacked their spending into individual spending details, offers a first step
toward a debiasing intervention. Note that the unpacking procedure required participants simply
to think about and list what they would buy - participants did not have to engage in more
extensive planning such as estimating and mathematically integrating each individual purchase
(as a decomposition approach would demand of them). This unpacking procedure may be a
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particularly easy approach to de-biasing spending predictions, and may even be employed
spontaneously in some circumstances: approximately one-third of participants predicting weekly
spending in Study 6 employed a similar technique spontaneously by mentioning at least the
concrete purchase events in their thought listings.
Although Study 7 identified the extent to which participants focused on their financial
goals as one mediator of the unpacking effect, there may be a number of reasons why unpacking
increased prediction accuracy. It might be that unpacking made it cognitively easier to process
complex prediction targets, as implied by Kruger and Evans (2004). Note that Kruger and Evans
did not test the mechanisms by which unpacking increased completion time predictions in the
domain of time predictions. Thus, it may be that the mediator uncovered in Study 7 applies not
only to the financial domain: unpacking may reduce the biasing influence of performance goals
across several domains. It might also be, however, that the present unpacking procedure
exhibited a unique pattern of effects due to the domain under investigation. Unpacking weekly
spending into individual spending components may have induced a mindset in weekly spending
forecasters that was more similar to that of event spending forecasters.
It is interesting to note that the unpacking procedure reduced the underestimation bias
more than did the procedure designed to weaken savings goals in Study 4 (bias effect sizes were
.06 and .20 respectively, compared to an average .62 bias effect size in the control conditions
across studies).
Money and Time
This program of research can contribute to an emerging literature exploring similarities
and differences in judgments across the domains of money and time (e.g., Okada & Hoch, 2004;
Soman, 2001; Zauberman & Lynch, 2005). The present studies identify a systematic bias in
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weekly spending predictions - a "budget fallacy" - similar to the prevalent "planning fallacy"
bias in time prediction (Buehler et al., 1994; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The results for
weekly spending predictions were in fact remarkably similar to the findings of previous research
on the planning fallacy (Buehler et al., 2002). Recall that a defining feature of the planning
fallacy is that people underestimate the time they will spend on a future task even though they
are aware that previous tasks have taken considerably longer. Similarly, current participants
predicted they would spend less money than they actually did, as well as less money than they
remembered spending previously. They appeared to dissociate their predictions from memories
of relevant previous experience. In addition, one of the underlying mechanisms for the planning
fallacy is the motivation to finish a project early (Buehler et al., 1997), a concept that may be
linked to the goal to minimize spending in the context of a budget fallacy.
However, Studies 5-7 identified a very important limitation to the similarities between a
budget fallacy and the planning fallacy: when the prediction target was a concrete event, there
was no difference between remembered, predicted, and actual spending. Interestingly, then, if the
present investigation had not examined both types of prediction targets, evidence might have
implied very different conclusions depending on which target had been examined. Research
limited to spending events (arguably the more direct parallel to planning fallacy research) would
have concluded that predictions for time and money are very different, whereas research limited
to time period spending predictions would highlight similarities. Neither examination would
have provided a complete picture. Future research should explore the degree to which a "budget
fallacy" and "planning fallacy" share common boundary conditions, underlying mechanisms, and
psychological consequences, and should be careful to examine both event and time period
spending predictions.
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Limitations
One limitation of the present studies is the population studied. Most of the studies
sampled from university students who could differ in many relevant ways (e.g., SES background,
disposable income, parental support, leisure time, fixed expenses, personal characteristics) from
other demographic groups. Interestingly, some of the unique characteristics of university
students could make them prone to prediction error. For example, undergraduates may have
relatively little experience in budgeting and, given that they may have parental support, there
may be little incentive to avoid overspending. On the other hand, given that students have
relatively few expenses to keep in mind, one could expect them to have less difficulty predicting
expenses than would individuals with more complex expenditures.
Some of the sampling issues were addressed in Study 6. Using a more diverse and older
sample, the direction and the magnitude of the prediction bias was replicated. Non-students
predicted to spend more than students, and actually did spend more, so that the extent of bias was
comparable. However, even the sample in Study 6 may differ from the general population in
important ways (e.g., interest in psychology research, education level). Future studies should
examine spending predictions in a variety of social groups that differ in pertinent characteristics
such as SES, disposable income, size of family, level of education, and age. These factors might
influence the prediction bias as well as the effectiveness of different planning interventions.
Another concern relevant to the present studies is the typicality of the prediction targets.
Replicating the main findings over several studies suggests that the weeks and events under
observation were not particularly unusual. I also avoided collecting data in weeks that preceded
or followed unusual times of the year (Christmas holidays, reading week, first week of classes).
In some studies I assessed ratings of how typical or usual the prediction targets were. Typicality
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was not explicitly defined in terms of typical expenses. Therefore, rating a target as unusual did
not necessarily imply unusually high or low expenses but could refer to other unusual features of
the target. See Table 17 for the dates when each study was conducted and for a summary of
typicality ratings where available.
Another limitation of the present studies is that they did not explore the role of individual
differences between participants. In each sample, there were participants who accurately (and
sometimes pessimistically) predict their spending, even though the majority exhibited an
optimistic bias. There may be reliable differences that distinguish accurate forecasters from
others, such as personality variables (self-esteem, trait optimism, conscientiousness). For
exploratory purposes I included a limited number of personality scales in some of the present
studies. Table 18 summarizes the results of personality scales for those studies where
dispositional measures were administered. Future studies might examine more systematically the
role of personality variables on spending predictions.
Future Directions
There may be other ways to reduce people's reliance on savings goals besides the
unpacking procedure. It might be that simply instructing participants to ignore savings goals
would result in less optimistically biased predictions. On the other hand, such instructions might
have ironic effects similar to thought suppression (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987).
Recall that I speculated that unpacking weekly spending reduced people's focus on savings goals
because it increased their awareness of other goals (e.g., making a friend happy, eating well,
buying fashionable clothes). Future studies could examine the role of savings goals in event
predictions and unpacked weekly predictions in more detail. For example, future studies may
examine the cognitive accessibility (e.g., Shah et al., 2002) of savings goals during prediction to
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determine whether savings goals are suppressed or simply ignored during event and unpacked
predictions.
Another interesting avenue for future research is to explore the incongruity between goals
and spending behavior. I had hypothesized that people's goals would have relatively little impact
on actual spending, in light of the considerable challenges involved in monitoring and controlling
spending (Faber & Vohs, 2004; Rabinovich & Webley, 2007). Still it is intriguing that people's
goals had no measurable impact on their spending across all studies. One possible explanation is
that the goals were too abstract and lacked concrete plans for implementation (Armor & Taylor,
2003; Gollwitzer, 1999). Indeed, research on financial behavior has identified several concrete
strategies that can help people to bring their spending more in line with their goals, including
pre-commitment strategies (e.g., Shefrin & Thaler, 1992), setting detailed budgets and tracking
expenses (e.g., Heath & Soil, 1996), and developing concrete plans for implementing financial
goals (e.g., Rabinovich & Webley, 2007). However, note again that strategies designed to control
behavior will not necessarily eliminate prediction bias if these strategies also influence
prediction, and thus I emphasize that research should continue to explore the relative impact of
factors on prediction and behavior. Also, interventions that reduce actual spending (as opposed
to bringing predictions in line with behavior) might not always be better or desirable. Indeed, in
some contexts spending money increases happiness - for example when money is spent on
others (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008) or when it is spent on experiences rather than material
goods (Van Boven, 2005). When actual spending should not or cannot be changed, accurate
knowledge about how much one will spend in the future may be particularly important and
valuable.
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Given that accurate spending predictions should lead to less debt and financial worries,
strategies that improve accuracy may have a positive impact on people's life quality. However, it
is important to note that budgeting, on the whole, does not only depend on spending predictions,
but also on other predictions, such as earning or saving predictions. Knowledge about
availability of money includes both incoming (saving, earning) and outgoing money (spending).
There is some evidence that these forms of budgeting are afflicted with similar biases as
spending predictions. For example, students inaccurately predict to save a large percentage of
their summer earnings (Koehler, White, & John, 2007) and students as well as financial analysts
inaccurately overestimate earning probabilities of large firms (Whitecotton, 1996). To improve
financial planning significantly, future interventions might need to tackle more than one faulty
prediction process simultaneously.
Concluding Remarks
Personal spending predictions have widespread practical implications. Major life
decisions as well as everyday choices almost always involve a consideration of future expenses.
The present research fills an existing gap in the social psychological prediction literature, by
examining effects of goals on predictions within the realm of personal finance, and gives some
initial accounts of sources for accuracy and bias in personal spending predictions. By identifying
factors that can improve day-to-day budgeting and restrain personal spending, the research has
direct applications in programs aimed at improving the quality of personal financial planning and
decision making. Knowing accurately what the future will bring and how much money will be
available might lead to informed (and better) spending decisions, resulting in less debt and
financial worries, and could eventually have a positive impact on people's life quality.
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Endnotes
In this study and subsequent studies, I omitted outliers (defined as participants with
predicted or actual spending more than 3 Standard Deviations above or below the mean) from
the reported samples, as follows: one participant from Study 1, two participants from Study 2,
two participants from Study 4, two participants from Study 6, and four participants from Study 7.
After omitting outliers, the distributions of predicted and actual spending were approximately
normal. The pattern of results remains unchanged if the outliers are included in analyses.
In this study and Study 4, degrees of freedom differ slightly across analyses due to
missing data.
Note that I refer to participants as having relatively stronger or weaker savings goals
throughout the manuscript (rather than as thinking of saving as relatively important or
unimportant). The savings goal item was phrased "Saving money is important to me". Therefore,
participants' responses to this item might alternatively be understood as representing the
importance of saving rather than the strength of saving goals.
4

1 did not have a priori hypotheses concerning the supplementary items included in the

money attitudes survey in Studies 2, 3, 6 and 7. Exploratory analyses indicated that they were not
significantly correlated with spending predictions. Also, when predicted weekly spending was
regressed simultaneously on the savings goal as well as the remaining supplementary measures,
only the savings goal emerged as a significant predictor in Study 2 (fi = -.57, t(30) = -2.47,/? <
.05), Study 3 (fi = -.40, r(81) = -3.52,/? < .01), Study 6 (week condition:^ = -.57, /(25) = -3.00,p
< .05), and in Study 7 (week control condition:^ = -.47, r(14) = -.95,/? = .07). See Table 19 for
correlations of all money attitude items with predicted and actual spending across studies.
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Because there was much variation in spending in this study (possibly because this was a
heterogeneous sample of community members with vastly different income levels), I also
conducted the same analysis with log transformed values for predicted and actual spending. The
target by spending interaction remained significant, F(\, 59) = 10.42,/? = .002.
6

Participants with incomplete diary data did not differ from other participants in their

spending predictions. I conducted additional analyses including participants with incomplete
diary data (substituting the missing days with the mean daily spending for that participant) and
there was no change in the patterns of analyses. However, because extrapolating weekly
spending from very incomplete diaries might increase error variance, I selected the conservative
procedure of excluding participants with less than 5 diary entries.
7

1 also included a no prediction control group in the weekly spending conditions. Twenty

randomly assigned participants completed the first session without making an overall spending
prediction and without listing the items they might buy in the next week. At the end of the week,
they reported having spent $151.21 (SD = 99.59), which was not significantly different from
participants' spending in the control condition, t(45) - .03,p = .89, d = .01, or the unpacking
condition, /(46) = -29, p = .77, d = .09.
8

In a preliminary investigation of monthly spending, I asked 365 participants to predict

their spending for the next month (i.e., the next 30 days) and to report their spending for the past
month. These questions were embedded in a larger questionnaire administered to undergraduate
students during mass-testing. Participants reported having spent an average $527.14 (SD =
440.37) in the past month and expected to spend $431.61 (SD = 403.98) in the next month, thus
predicting to reduce their spending significantly, ^(364) = 13.39,/? < .001, d= 1.40. However,
this study did not assess actual spending for the target time periods and thus it is conceivable (if
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unlikely) that participants actually did have lower expenditures in the future month than they had
previously.
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Appendix A
Weekly Spending Prediction Instructions

Study 1 and Study 2: How much money do you think will you spend next week (i.e.
the next 7 days, all expenses included except things that only occur once a month
such as rent)? |$

Study 3, Study 4, Study 5, and Study 7: Now, we would like you to think more
specifically about your spending for the next week (i.e., the next 7 days, starting
tomorrow morning). Think about all your expenses, including everything except
fixed expenses that occur only once a month, such as rent. Also include expenses that
you will buy with cards (your Laurier one-card, debit, or credit card) or cash. How
much money will you spend next week? I will spend [$

| next week

Study 6: Now, we would like you to think more specifically about your spending for
the next week (i.e., the next 7 days, starting tomorrow morning). Think about all your
expenses, including everything except fixed expenses that occur only once a month,
such as rent. Also include expenses that you will buy with cards (e.g., debit, or credit
card) or cash. How much money will you spend next week? I will spend |$
next week.
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Appendix B
Event Spending Prediction Instructions

Study 5: Now, please estimate, to the best of your ability, how much money you will
spend on the birthday of

(initial). Please include all costs of the celebration

(e.g., transportation cost, gifts, drinks). |$

Study 6 and Study 7: Now, think about all your expenses for this event. Include all
expenses associated with this event, those that you need to buy before the event
started (e.g., tickets for the movies), and those you need to buy during the event (e.g.,
drinks at the movies). Include expenses that you buy with cards (i.e., debit card,
credit card) or cash. How much money will you spend for the event that you just
described above? I will spend K

Appendix C
Money Attitudes Survey (Studies 2, 3, 6, 7)

Now, we would like to know about your general attitudes towards money and spendin
in general. Please respond to the following statements by selecting the field that best
represents your response.
How much do you agree with the following statements?

1. Money is very important for me.

Disagree
Entirely

•r

r

r

r

r

r

r

Agree
Entirely

„ I often think about how I will spend my
money.

Disagree
Entirely

r

r

r

c

r

r

r

Agree
Entirely

I save some of my available money each
3- month.

Disagree
Entirely

r

f'~"'

r

c

r

r

r

Agree
Entirely

Disagree
Entirely

r

r

r

r

r

r

r

Agree
Entirely

Disagree
Entirely

r

r

r

c

r

*** r

Agree
Entirely

Disagree
Entirely

r

r

c

c c r

r

Agree
Entirely

Disagree
Entirely

r

r

c

c

r

Agree
Entirely

4

(Study 2,3,7)Sav\ng money is very important
- for me.

I feel that I know exactly what I spend my
5- money on
(Study 2) I feel the amount of money that I
' have is insufficient.
(Study 3,6,7) I often try to estimate how much
I will spend in the future
7 (Study 2) I have very little money available
' each month, compared to my friends.
(Study 3) I often try to estimate what I will
spend my money on in the future.
(Study 6) I usually spend a lot more money
than I thought I would.
R

c

r

Note. Study 2 used a 10-point response scale, and Studies 3, 6, and 7 used a 7-point response
scale (as depicted). Items 6 and 7 varied as indicated.
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Appendix D
Diary Surveys (Study 2)
MORNING QUESTIONNAIRE (please complete as early in the day as possible)
Date:
Time:
a.m./ p.m.
Please estimate, to the best of your ability:
How much money will you spend today (all expenses included except things that only occur
once a month, e.g. rent): $
I am sure that this prediction is an accurate estimation of today's expenses.
1
Disagree
entirely

2

.3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Agree
entirely

8

9

10
Agree
entirely

I feel that I know exactly what I will spend that money on.
1
Disagree
entirely

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please put this paper in the envelope and do not look at it again.

EVENING QUESTIONNAIRE (please complete as late in the day as possible)
Date:
Time:
a.m./ p.m.
Please think for a moment about today's expenses. What did you spend money on? Please sum
all your purchases up and estimate, to the best of your ability:
How much money did you spend today (all expenses included except things that only occur once
a month, e.g. rent): $
I am sure that this is an accurate estimation of today's expenses.
1
Disagree
entirely

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Agree
entirely

8

9

10
Agree
entirely

I feel that 1 know exactly what I spent that money on.
1
Disagree
entirely

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please put this paper in the envelope and do not look at it again.
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FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE — after completion, please return the sealed envelope with your
diary questionnaires to the Psychology Main Office.
We are interested in your experience and opinion with this diary study. Please keep in mind that
your responses are entirely anonymous and answer as honestly as possible.
Please circle the response that represents your experience best:
a) I completed all diary sheets on time.
b) I forgot to complete some of the diary sheets and completed them up to 24 hours later.
c) I forgot to complete some of the diary sheets and completed them at the end of the entire
survey, after 7 days.
d) I forgot to complete some of the diary sheets and did not complete them at a later point.
Please think for a moment about last week's expenses. What did you spend money on? Please
sum up all your purchases and estimate to the best of your ability. (Do not look back to your
previously completed daily estimates)
Plow much money did you spend last week (all expenses included except things that only occur
once a month, e.g. rent): $
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Appendix E
Savings Goal Manipulation (Study 4)

Strong Savings Goal: Research indicates that people who are careful about their
expenses, and save rather than spend money are generally more successful in life. For
example, they have more satisfying relationships and more interesting and fulfilling
careers. These are some reasons for this phenomenon: (a) Financial security allows
people to develop satisfying relationships, (b) People who save money do not have
shallow friendships that are based on consumption, (c) People who save money are able
to take opportunities when they arise (e.g. because they have the funds), and (d) Saving
money is just one indicator of a future oriented approach to life, which is linked to career
success.

Weak Savings Goal: Research indicates that people who are more generous with their
expenses, and spend rather than save money, are generally more successful in life. For
example, they have more satisfying relationships and more interesting and fulfilling
careers. These are some reasons for this phenomenon: (a) Financial spontaneity allows
people to develop satisfying relationships, (b) People who spend money do not have
boring friendships based on convenience, (c) People who spend money are able to take
opportunities when they arise (e.g. because they are not afraid to take chances), and (d)
Spending money is just one indicator of a spontaneous approach to life, which is linked to
career success.
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Appendix F
Birthday Nomination Instructions (Study 5)

In this study, we are interested people's preparations for their friends' birthdays.
Please take a moment now to think about a friend or family member whose birthday is
within the next two months and whose birthday you would celebrate (e.g. go to a
birthday party or buy a present). Please type the initial of this friend in this box |_
Please record the birthday of this friend (click here for a calendar. Type a range if you
are not sure which day it is) (mm/dd)_________
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Appendix G
Event Nomination Instructions (Study 6 and 7)

Now, we would like you to think more specifically about an event in the future that you
will spend money on. Think about an event that you know will be happening in the next
10 days that fulfills the following criteria:
1. An event that will require you to spend at least some money (e.g., going to the
movies rather than watching TV with your friends).
2. An event that takes at least half an hour (e.g., a full movie rather than a brief
video clip).

Describe the event below:
[expanding textbox]

When will the event take place? 1

DD/MM/YY
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Appendix H
Unpacking Manipulation (Study 7)

Weekly Group: What items will you buy next week? Now, please list as many details of
next week's spending as you can think of. Include all your expenses, except fixed
expenses that occur only once a month, such as rent. Include expenses that you will buy
with cards (your Laurier one-card, debit, or credit card) or cash. Use as many or as few
lines as you need.
Day 1 -Tomorrow [expanding textbox 1]
Items:
Day 7 [expanding textbox 7]
Items:

Event Group: What items will you buy before or during the event? Now, please list as
many details of your expenses for this event as you can think of. Include all expenses
associated with this event, those that you need to buy before the event started (e.g., tickets
for the movies), and those you need to buy during the event (e.g., drinks at the movies).
Include expenses that you will buy with cards (your Laurier one-card, debit, or credit
card) or cash. Use as many or as few lines as you need.
[expanding textbox 1]

[expanding textbox 10]
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Appendix I
Thought Focus Rating Scales (Study 7, Week Group)
How much does each of the following statements describe your thoughts when you were making
your prediction of how much you'll spend next week?
.

I thought about the items that I plan to
purchase next week.

„

I thought about the prices of items that I
plan to purchase next week.

I thought about which items I might buy
3. on impulse (i.e., without planning to buy
them).
. I thought
about each individual day
y of
4.
. a .
next week.
I tried to imagine what activities I might do
5. next week that require me to spend
money.
I thought about the week as a whole.
fi

N

, .
o a a

Mt t
o a a

c

I thought about how much I ideally want
10. to spend.
11

I thought about how much I ought to
- spend.

I thought about how much money I want
12. to save next week (e.g. to buy something
big later on).
I thought about how much money I want
13. to save for other big items in the long
term.
I thought about how much money I have
14
- available next week.
15

I thought about unforeseeable expenses
- that might happen next week.

I was just guessing; I don't know how
16. arrived at my prediction.

i.

<•

y"«

.»*

*»•.

Very much

r

*«<»

y«*

****

., , , ,
Not at al

r

c c c

r

r

r

Very much

Not at al

r

r

r

r

r

r

r

Very much

t

>.

i

i

t

r

Very much

i

t

i.

r

r

Very much

r

r

e r r

Very much

r

M t t l

r

r

I thought about how much I usually spend
8- in a regular week.
Notatal
I thought about how much I spent last
- week (i.e., the last 7 days).

%

r

I thought of the next week as one week in
7- many this year.
Notatal

9

r

Not at al

r

r

Not at ai

r

Not at al

r

r

Very much

r

r

Not at al

i

r

(

y .

r

r

e r e

r

r

P

p

r

p.

Not at al

r

r

r

Not at al

c

r

c

N o t at al

r

r

r

N o t at al

r

r

r

Not at al

r

r

t

r

r

i

r

r

Very much

Very much
Very much

c

c

Very much
Very much

i •

t * r

Very much

r

r

r

Very much

f

c
t

i

r

Very much
Very much
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Appendix J
Thought Focus Rating Scales (Study 7, Event Group)
How much does each of the following statements describe your thoughts when you were making
your prediction of how much you'll spend next week?
,

1

2

I thought about the items that.I plan to
purchase before and during the event.

.... ,• „
.:;No*.ata"

I thought about the prices of items that I
plan to purchase for the event.

I thought about which items I might buy
3. on impulse (i.e., without planning to buy
them).
4.
I tried to imagine what activities I might do
5. before and during the event that require
me to spend money.
~ I thought about the event as a whole.
M
6.
I thought of the event as one event in
7
- many this year.

r.

r

^
r

~
r

^
r

^

r.

r

r

,-.
Very much

r

r

*
Not at all

f*

f"

f

~"

^

Not at all

(~

r

f

"

<~ <~

„. , , ..
Not at all

*~
<

,.-.
f

r.
<

,-<

^
(

Not at all

C

C

C

r

f

I thought about how much I usually spend
8- for similar events.
Not at all

C

C

C

C

I thought about how much I spent for the
9- last event that was similar.

Not at all

C

C

r

I thought about how much I ideally want
10. t 0 s p e n c |

Not at all

>"

Not at all

^

Not at all

s

Not at all

C

Not at all

f"

Very much

<~*

Very much

,*•-

„ ,
w
Very much

r

r

Very much

C

C

c

Very much

r

r

r

r

Very much

<~ <'

*•'

<"

<~

r

Very much

<"

<

r

<~

<

r

Very much

c

c

c

<"'

r

C

c

f

C

C

C

C

C

cm

Very much

Not at all

<""

C

C

c

r

r

r

Very much

Not at all

C

C

..
C

C

..
r

C

r

Very much

*

f""

r

r

--.

(

f

I thought about how much I ought to
11.

spenCj.

I thought about how much money I want
12. to save next week (e.g. to buy something
big later on).
I thought about how much money I want
13. to save for other big items in the long
term.
I thought about how much money I have
14. available.
I thought about unforeseeable expenses
15. that might happen before and during the
event.
I was just guessing; I don't know how I
16-arrived at my prediction.

~' <•"

r

r

*~

Very much

c

Very much
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations of Weekly Spending (Study 1)
past week
spending (1)
M
SD

126.03
117.70

predicted
spending (2)
94.33
77.27

actual
spending (3)
121.67
195.11

0)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Note. **jP<.01

.75**
.39*
.57**

.61**
79**

.54**

next week
spending (4)
85.17
75.77

Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Weekly Spending (Study 2)
predicted
spending (1)

actual
spendingdiary (2)

M
SD

95.00
67.31

150.75
78.54

(1)
(2)
(3)

-.01
.19

Note. ** c x . 0 1

.79**

actual
spending followup (3)
.166.21
97.31
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Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Daily Spending (Study 2)
Mean predicted
Mean actual
weekly spending weekly spending
(2)
(1)
M
SD

24.08
11.31

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Note.

.86**
.60**
.37*

**p<.0\

24.80
11.26

.60**
49**

Mean predicted
weekend
spending (3)
26.98
11.61

03**

Mean actual
weekend
spending (4)
32.82
13.03
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Table 4. Correlation of Savings Goals with Weekly and Daily Spending (Study 2)
predicted
spending

Savings
goals

Note. **£><.01

-.37*

actual
spending diary
-.15

actual
spending followup
-.04

Mean
predicted daily
spending
-.08
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Table 5. Means, Standard Deviations and Inter-correlations of Weekly Spending (Study 3)
Goals measured separately
(delayed condition)
past week
predicted
spending (1)
spending (2)
M
SD
(1)
(2)

125.25
78.58

.44*

Note. * p<.05, ** p<.0\

106.70
62.18

Goals measured in session
(immediate condition)
past week
predicted
spending (1)
spending (2)
106.09
63.06

.56**

94.40
60.37
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Table 6. Correlations of Savings Goals with Spending (Study 3)
Goals measured separately
(delayed condition)
past week
predicted
spending
spending
Savings goals
(delayed)
Savings goals
(immediate)

-.15

Note. *p<.05, **/?<.01

-.40**

Goals measured in session
(immediate condition)
past week
predicted
spending
spending
-.26

-.32*

-.20

-.37*
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Table 7. Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations of Weekly Spending (Study 4)
Weak savings goal
condition
predicted
actual
spending (1)
spending (2)
M
SD
(1)
(2)

Note. *p<.05,

126.67
50.34

.74**

**p<.01

154.67
91.84

Strong savings goal
condition
predicted
actual
spending (1)
spending (2)
83.13
51.28

.54*

178.19
138.98
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Table 8. Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations for Weekly and Birthday spending
(Study 5)
Weekly Spending

M
SD
(1)
(2)

Birthday Spending

predicted
spending (1)

actual
spending (2)

predicted
spending (1)

actual
spending (2)

130.22
105.27

173.50
105.81

59.69
50.15

53.82
45.00

.64**

.64*
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Table 9. Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations of Weekly and Event Spending
(Study 6)

Weekly Spending

M
SD
(1)
(2)

Note.

predicted
spending (1)

actual
spending (2)

202.94
188.89

285.58
233.00

79**

**p<.0\

Event Spending
predicted
spending (1)
118.91
180.54

94**

actual
spending (2)
113.31
157.41
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Table 10. Correlation of Savings Goals with Weekly and Event Spending (Study 6)
Event Spending

Weekly Spending
predicted
spending
Savings goals
(immediate)

Note.

*p<.05

-.44*

actual
spending
-.33

predicted
spending
-.15

actual
spending
-.08
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Table 11. Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations of Weekly and Event Spending
(Study 7)
Weekly Spending
Control
predicted
spending

Event Spending

Unpacking

actual
predicted
spending spending

Control

actual
predicted
spending spending

Unpacking

actual
predicted
spending spending

actual
spending

M

112.41

150.45

165.54

159.42

45.32

49.44

60.71

54.91

SD

72.63

86.29

95.83

93.67

40.38

45.54

71.46

58.74

(1)
(2)

.41*

Note. *p<.05,

.66**

**p<.0\

.93**

.87**
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Table 12. Correlation of Savings Goals with Weekly and Event Spending by Condition
(Study 7)
Weekly Spending
Control

Unpacking

predicted actual
predicted
spending spending spending
Savings
-.44*
goals
(delayed)

Note. * p < .05

-.16

Event Spending

.12

Control

Unpacking

actual
predicted
spending spending

actual
spending

predicted
spending

actual
spending

.34

.03

.20

.26

.15
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Table 13. Means and Standard Deviations of the Complete Thought Focus Scales (Study 7)
Weekly Spending
Control
Item

Event Spending

Unpacking

Control

Unpacking

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

1

5.56

1.40

5.75

1.60

5.79

1.32

5.84

1.16

2

5.15

1.68

5.46

1.69

3.45

1.94

3.48

1.48

3

4.07

1.96

3.64

2.08

3.66

1.91

3.65

1.99

4

3.85

2.35

2.96

1.97

5

5.67

1.18

5.57

1.79

4.76

1.57

4.55

1.80

6

5.26

1.58

4.29

2.09

5.75

1.38

5.48

1.50

7

3.93

1.94

3.85

2.13

4.79

2.19

5.00

2.00

8

5.04

1.79

5.04

1.80

6.28

1.13

5.23

1.75

9

4.81

1.84

4.32

2.09

6.48

.74

5.03

1.84

10

5.67

1.14

4.86

1.65

4.79

1.72

3.06

1.90

11

5.22

1.58

4.75

1.86

4.00

1.71

3.39

1.87

12

4.15

2.01

2.82

1.93

2.76

1.75

3.87

2.30

13

4.00

2.04

2.70

1.94

3.10

2.02

3.06

1.69

14

4.56

2.03

4.00

2.11

3.66

1.90

5.94

1.37

3.70

2.05

3.64

2.04

2.66

1.76

6.06

1.29

2.19

1.33

2.18

1.42

1.48

.79

1.97

1.40

15
16

-

Note. For item wording see Appendix I and Appendix J, respectively. Item 10 and Item 12 were
aggregated to form a measure of thought focus on financial goals.
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Table 14. Correlation of Thought Focus Scales with Predicted and Actual Spending (Study 7)
Weekly Spending
Control
Item

1

Event Spending

Unpacking

Control

Unpacking

predicted

actual

predicted

actual

predicted

actual

predicted

actual

-.21

-.17

-.40*

-.29

.08

.12

.09

.10

T

-.19

.06

.05

-.04

-.02

.19

.10

.05

.04

2

-.26

-.07

-.36

3

.09

.29

.04

.04

4

-.19

-.01

-.22

-.04

5

.05

-.02

-.12

-.18

.40*

.38*

.05

.11

6

.07

.05

-.04

.06

.22

.22

-.11

-.04

7

.48*

.28

.12

.13

.40*

.39*

-.07

-.12

8

.17

.04

-.11

-.25

.23

.28

-.29

-.25

9

.10

-.05

-.01

.09

.22

.28

-.28

-.19

10

-.26

-.10

-.45*

-.22

.17

.06

-.09

-.16

11

.09

.05

-.29

-.05

•12

.15

-.09

-.11

-.26

-.03

-.06

-.12

-.10

-.18

-.06

-.05

-.06

-.04

T

12

.03

.14

-.35

13

-.02

-.10

-.32

1

14

-.20

.01

-.03

-.01

.38*

.32 '

.01

.02

15

.15

.31

.02

-.02

.40*

.40*

.04

.04

16

.02

.24

-.01

.03

.21

.23

-.14

-.08

Note. *p < .10, * p < .05. For item wording see Appendix I and Appendix J, respectively. Item
10 and Item 12 were aggregated to form a measure of thought focus on financial goals.
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Table 15. Summary of Predicted and Actual Spending Across All Studies
Target

Condition

N

Predicted
Spending

Actual
Spending

paired
t-test (t)

Study 1 next week

31

$94

$122

2.29*

Study 2 next week

36

$95

$151

3.18**

Study 3 next week

88

$101

correlation
(r)

.61*'
-.01

Study 4 next week

strong
savings goal

16

$83

$178

3.91**

.54*

next week

weak
savings goal

14

$127

$155

1.29

74**

69

$130

$174

3.59**

.64**

65

$60

$54

-0.16

.64**

31

$203

$286

3.02**

29

$119

$113

-0.27

94**

control

27

$112

$150

2.39*

.41*

next week

unpacking

28

$166

$159

0.39

.66**

event

control

29

$45

$49

0.78

Q"3**

event

unpacking

31

$61

$55

- 1.14

0-7**

Study 5 next week
birthday

Study 6 next week
event

Study 7 next week

Note.

*p<.05,**p<.0l.

TO**

Table 16. Confidence about Predictions and Spending Reports
Study

Item assessing certainty of...

Study 1
(1-10 scale)
Study 2
(1-10 scale)

M

SD

target week prediction
second week prediction

6.39
6.74

2.19

mean
mean
mean
mean

7.27
8.69
7.28

1.42

8.91

1.18

daily
daily
daily
daily

prediction
actual report
predicted purchase awareness
actual purchase awareness

1.91

1.08
1.63

Study 3
(1-7 scale)

target week prediction

4.80

1.42

Study 4
Weak goals
(1-7 scale)

target week prediction
actual week report

4.70
4.82

1.15
.98

Strong goals
(1-7 scale)

target week prediction

4.10

1.45

actual week report

4.77

1.30

Study 6
(1-7 scale)

event prediction
actual event report

5.14
6.34

1.66
1.05

target week prediction

5.32

1.49

actual week report

5.61

1.41

event prediction

5.76

1.00

actual event report

6.45

target week prediction

4.81

.91
1.47

actual week report
target event prediction

4.70
5.74

actual event report

6.30

1.09
.92

target week prediction

4.79

1.45

actual week report

4.15

1.87

Study 7
Control
(1-7 scale)

Study 7
Unpacking
(1-7 scale)

Note. Higher numbers indicate more certainty.
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Table 17. Typicality of Prediction Targets
Time 1

Time 2 (Followup)

"How unusual is
next week?"
(7=Very Unusual)

Time of study

M
Study 1

Jul 9-Jul 20

Study 2

Jan 15-Feb 30

Study 3

Nov 4-Nov 29

Study 4

Mar 20-Apr 30

Study 5
Birthday

Jan 2-Apr 30

Study 6
Week
Study 6
Event

Jan 16-Mar25
&Novl6-Decl4

Study 7
Week
Study 7

1

Event

j

>

SD

"How typical is
the amount of
money you spent
last week for your
usual weekly
spending?"
(7=Very typical)

M

SD

5.26

2.83

4.54

2.58

2.11

2.36

1.66

"Was there
anything unusual
about last week/this
event? (e.g., you
might have had
midterms)"
(7=Very Unusual)

M

SD

3.29

2.05

4.37

2.21

2.50

1.93

1.44

Sept 25-Nov 12

Note. Participants responded on 7-point scales.
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Table 18. Personality Variables and Spending

M

SD

correlation correlation
with
with
predicted
actual
spending
spending

Study 3
(Week)

RSES

6.16

.46

-.05

LOT-R

4.50

1.09

.11

Study 7
(Week)

RSES

5.07

1.11

-.08

-.02

LOT-R

4.32

1.00

-.06

.01

Study 7
(Event)

RSES

5.13

1.01

.05

-.06

LOT-R

4.47

1.19

.03

.01

Note. ** p < .01. Participants responded on 7-point scales. RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale (Rosenberg, 1965); LOT-R = Life Orientation Test - Revised (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges,
1994).

.08
-.21
-.08
.01
-.09
.18
.07
-.09
.02
-.03
-.05

predicted
actual
predicted
actual
predicted
actual
predicted
actual

Event

Unpacking

Control

.27
.24
-.09
-.18
.24
.10
-.50**
-.59"

-.05
-.03
.03

.02

-.21
-.07

-.42*
-.31
-.41*

I often
think
about
how I will
spend my
money.

.13
.05
-.37*
-.36*
.05
.06
-.18
-.51"

-.34*
-.07

-.10
.02
.06

I save at
least
some
money
each
month.

-.41*
.15
.20
.26
.15
.03
.12
.34

-.33
-.15
-.08

-.44'

-.37*
.19

.01
-.08

. 49**

Saving
money is
very
important
for me.

.36
-.01
-.41
-.38'
-.01
.01
-.17
-.28

-.03
-.08
.02
.11

-.12
-.34"

I know
exactly
what I
spend my
money
on.

Note. Item wording is abbreviated. For the complete item wording see Appendix D.

Study 7
Event

Unpacking

Control

.04

predicted
actual
predicted
actual

Week

Study 6

Study 7
Week

-.25
.02

predicted
predicted

Delayed
Immediate

-.22
-.24
-.30

predicted
actual-diary
actual-followup

Study 3

Study 2

Money is
very
important
for me.

Table 19. Money Attitude Correlations with Predicted and Actual Spending Across Studies.

-.17
-.28
-.26

I feel
my
money
is insufficient.

-.05
-.17
-.15

I have
very little
money
compared
to my
friends.

.45*
.29
-.20
-.04
.29
.46'
-.25
-.32

-.17
-.38"

I often try
to estimate
how much
I will
spend.

-.22
-.12

I often
try to
estimat
e what
I will
buy.

-.05
.03
-.08

-.14

I usually
spend a
lot more
money
than I
thought.
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Figure 1. Predicted and actual weekly spending for people who endorsed saving goals strongly
(one SD above the mean) and weakly (one SD below the mean) (Study 2)
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Figure 2. Predicted and actual weekly spending for people in the weak savings goal condition
and people in the strong savings goal condition (Study 4)
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Figure 3. Predicted spending (controlling actual spending) for people who endorsed saving goals
strongly (one SD above the mean) and weakly (one SD below the mean) (Study 6)
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Figure 4. Predicted spending (controlling actual spending) for people who endorsed saving goals
strongly (one SD above the mean) and weakly (one SD below the mean) (Study 7)
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Thought Focus on
Savings Goals

Predicted Spending
Next Week

Unpacking (1)
vs. Control (0)

.16 (.30*

Event Spending Group

.12

Unpacking (1)
vs. Control (0)

Thought Focus on
Savings Goals

.05

Predicted Spending
For Event
.14 (.13)

Figure 5. Thought focus on savings goals mediates effect of unpacking for weekly spending
predictions (Study 7)

